Water Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 2

Article 6

1-1-2004

Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Protection: The
Opportunities and Impediments to Improved Public Interest
Involvement in Colorado's Instream Flow Protection Regime
Jason S. Wells

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Jason S. Wells, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Protection: The Opportunities and Impediments
to Improved Public Interest Involvement in Colorado's Instream Flow Protection Regime, 7 U. Denv. Water
L. Rev. 309 (2004).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

LEASING WATER RIGHTS FOR INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION:
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPEDIMENTS TO
IMPROVED PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVEMENT IN
COLORADO'S INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
REGIMEt
JASON S. WELLS:
I.
II.
III.

IV.

Introduction .................................................
310
A Brief History of Colorado's Instream Flow
Protection Regim e ...............................................................
312
The Competing Uses ...........................................................
315
A . A griculture ...........................................................................
315
B. Urban Expansion ................................................................
316
C . Conservation ........................................................................
317
A Potential Solution: A Guide to Successful Split-Season
and Dry-Year Leasing Programs ...........................................
319
A. Split-Season and Dry-Year Leases ........................................
321
1. Split-Season Leases .........................................................
321
2. D ry-Year Leases ...............................................................
322
B. How Lease Acquisitions Are Facilitated: Two
323
Progressive State M odels .....................................................
1. Montana: The Journey Toward Private Acquisition ..... 324
2. The Oregon Water Trust: Innovator in Private
Facilitation ......................................................................
334
C. Growing Interest and Commitment of Resources
to Private ISF R ights ............................................................
344

t The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to the following for their
guidance, insight and patience in assisting with the completion of this article: John
Carney, Executive Director, Colorado Water Trust; Lawrence J. MacDonnell and
Michael F. Browning, Porzak, Browning & Bushong; Anne Janicki, Colorado Water
Conservation Board; Melinda Kassen, Colorado Trout Unlimited; Laura Zeimer,
Montana Trout Unlimited, John Ferguson, Montana Water Trust; Fritz Paulus,
Oregon Water Trust; Drs. Lloyd Burton and Robert Gage, University of Colorado
Denver Graduate School of Public Affairs; and the staff and Editorial Board of the
Water Law Review. Each of these individuals was instrumental, in their varying
capacities, to establishing and maintaining the scope of this paper, fleshing out the
principal issues, and focusing the author's approach to an oftentimes overwhelming
subject area.
t Jason S. Wells received hisJD from the University of Denver College of Law in
May 2002 and MPA from the University of Colorado Denver Graduate School of Public
Affairs in December 2003.

WATER LAWREVIEW

V.
VI.
VII.

VIII.

Volume 7

Possible Limitations of Offstream to Instream Lease
346
Transfers: What Barriers Exist? ................................
Developments in Colorado Law: Steps toward
359
Free-Market Exchanges ......................................
364
Some Unanswered Questions ..................................
364
A. Legal Recognition of Private Party Involvement? ..............
367
B. Political A cceptance? ......................................
371
C . Practical Concerns ........................................
371
1. B en eficial? ...........................................
373
2. E nforceable? ..........................................
375
3. A ffordable? ..........................................
378
Conclusion ................................................
I. INTRODUCTION

As a policy problem, the struggle to equitably apportion water
resources among competing interests has received mounting attention
throughout the arid West in recent years. The prior appropriation
system underscores the importance of distributing water resources.
The system, which governs water allocation in Colorado, was one of
the first legal doctrines adopted in many western states. Even among
these states, however, Colorado finds itself in a unique position
because its mountains serve as the headwaters to several interstate river
systems including the Missouri, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado.
Colorado is contractually obligated to assure the delivery of set
quantities of water to numerous adjacent and non-contiguous states,
leaving Coloradans with limited quantities of usable water. Rapid
population growth has strained and continues to pressure already overappropriated river systems. Drought conditions are common in the
summer months, and agricultural interests often find themselves in
conflict with municipalities in struggles over water use.
The competition for finite water supplies has hampered efforts to
maintain adequate flow levels in Colorado's rivers and streams.
Although the State developed a system nearly thirty years ago to
address the public's concern over dwindling instream flows ("ISFs"),
many argue room for improvement exists in the system that has failed
to accomplish its goals. Others believe the existing system threatens
individual water rights. Thus, questions of policy implementation
often give rise to disputes between environmental and agricultural
interests, while municipalities vie for water rights against both
competing interests. These disputes have created a public discourse
infused with rhetoric and intense emotion.
Across the West, competing stakeholders have waged a continual
debate over the most beneficial course of policy formulation. While
agricultural interests have formed community alliances in opposition
to environmental interests, their conservationist counterparts have
developed coalitions to advance agendas sometimes overtly hostile to
agrarian interests. Luckily, however, some concerned, forward-looking
organizations have undertaken the arduous chore of devising mutually

Issue 2

LEASING WATER RIGHTS FOR INSTREAM FLOWPROTECTION

311

acceptable solutions in arid regions facing pending water crises. In
some cases, members of these two seemingly divergent factions have
negotiated successfully. This article evaluates several instances in
policies
both
created
and compromise
which
concession
groundbreaking and effective. Specifically, the article examines water
right leasing as one of many alternative approaches to instream flow
("ISF") protection currently employed by other states.
Most western states still operate under the principle that charging
a sole state agency with guardianship over the public's interest in
protecting the state's water resources is preferable to allowing the
private acquisition of instream rights. However, Oregon and Montana
have implemented progressive programs through which private
entities may lawfully possess or facilitate the acquisition of ISF rights
under lease agreements. In most cases, conservation organizations
acquire these leases from agricultural users who, for one reason or
another, prefer to forgo their full appropriative use rights by leasing
them either to the organizations themselves or to state entities, which,
in turn, leave the water instream.
As a relatively new organization dedicated to acquiring and using
water rights for conservation purposes, the Colorado Water Trust
("CWT") has sought to determine the feasibility of and impediments
to Colorado's adoption of legal leasing mechanisms similar to those
Oregon and Montana have implemented. The ability to lease water in
a free market, CWAT believes, significantly expands its ability to protect
Thus,
and restore Colorado's vital free-flowing water resources.
through the work of water attorneys, concerned water users, and
organizations in lease-friendly states, CWT is working to develop a
coherent blueprint for the expansion of allowable ISF acquisitions,
particularly those based on lease transactions.
In assessing the feasibility of ISF leasing in Colorado, this article
asserts that despite the rigidity of its body of water law, Colorado is
poised for a more progressive approach to streamflow protection. The
article first presents a history of Colorado law pertaining to ISF
acquisition and then details the legal caveats that have prevented the
adoption of a more dynamic flow preservation scheme. Section II
identifies the primary stakeholders a new mode of right transaction
would affect. Section III introduces the leasing models, contrasting
the relatively restrictive Colorado framework with those of Oregon and
Montana whose laws are more accommodating to the private
acquisition of ISF rights. Accordingly, this section offers a background
of the grassroots, political, and legislative histories of these states'
acquisition laws, while paying particular attention to what has worked
and what has not. Section IV presents a number of limitations
associated with ISF right leasing. Section V recounts some of the
recent developments in Colorado water law that reflect the growing
pressure across the West to loosen restraints on free market ISF
Finally, Section VI presents a feasibility analysis of
exchanges.
Colorado's prospective adoption of instream leasing statutes in light of
the existing legal framework and political environment.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COLORADO'S INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION REGIME
In Colorado, where the sun shines over three hundred days a year
and leaves the land dry and thirsty in most months, water is
increasingly becoming the state's most threatened natural resource.
Average precipitation in Colorado totals a mere sixteen and a half
inches per year.' As evidenced by the numerous water use restrictions
imposed statewide in 2002 and into 2003, the limited amount of
surface water produced by this relatively scant rain and snowfall barely
serves the current use practices of Colorado's burgeoning population.
Those wishing to preserve water in the state's rivers and streams have
experienced increasing frustration both with the lack of water after
senior agricultural and municipal users fulfill their rights and with the
rigidity and limited scope of the preservation programs. The problem,
as many see it, is that "Colorado ... has had in-stream flow protection
to keep bare minimum flows trickling ... during dry times. But the
provision is essentially useless. It protects a tiny percentage of streams
and is unenforceable, collapsing when senior water-rights holders call
for more water., 2 Others expressed their disfavor in more provincial
terms. As a recent comment in the Rocky Mountain News griped:
"Colorado's water allocation system is older than outhouses" and
needs substantial reform.!
The policy problems related to water use today can be traced to
the water development policies of the past. In 1902, Congress passed
the Reclamation Act.4

The Bureau of Reclamation, created shortly

after passage of the Act, "embarked upon a program of huge taxpayersubsidized dam and diversion projects to irrigate croplands and attract
more people to the region."
The plan worked, attracting many
potential farmers to the state who fervently applied their earlyacquired water rights to inefficient processes of cropland irrigation.
In terms of acre-feet of water used to achieve a given result, irrigation
is a costly endeavor, particularly when wasteful practices are employed.
One acre-foot of water ordinarily suffices to irrigate just one-half acre
of typical Colorado cropland each season.' This same amount of
water, which covers an acre of land to a depth of one foot, equals
1. Colo. River Water Users Ass'n, ColoradoState Profile, at
http://www.crwua.org/co/crwua-co.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
2. Ed Dentry, Go with the Flow: Conservationists Want State to Adjust Water Levels,
ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 9, 2002, at 17C.

3. Id.
4. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 371-616 (2002).
5. News Release, Western Water Alliance, 100 Years Later, U.S. Reclamation
Bureau Stuck in 19th Century (June 17, 2002), at
http://www.westernwateralliance.org/news-pr_061202.html.
6. See Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
657, 657-58 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Robert Benjamin Naeser & Lynne Lewis Bennett, The Cost of
Noncompliance: The Economic Value of Water in the Middle Arkansas River Valley, 38 NAT.
RESOURCES.

445, 458 (Summer 1998).
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roughly 326,000 gallons "or enough water to supply an urban family of
four for a year.""
While prior appropriation has demonstrated overwhelming success
over the years in apportioning water for consumptive uses, its
efficiency in doing so has in many ways stymied development of an
effective means to reserve water for non-consumptive, environmental
purposes. One fundamental premise of the prior appropriation
doctrine is "first in time is first in right."9 This legal adage means that
in times of low stream flow those who "appropriated" water rightsand were granted a legal right to a certain quantity of use-may divert
their decreed amounts of water to the detriment of 'Junior" users who
perfected a water right at a later time. Thus, the farmer with the
earliest appropriation on a river may divert the decreed amount, even
if that amount represents the entirety of the river's carriage at the
time.
Most rivers in Colorado are over-appropriated 0 because the
municipal and agricultural users who hold the majority of water rights
in the state sought, early on, to apply as much water as possible to
The
offstream uses in order to establish large senior rights.
unforeseen and unfortunate consequence of the prior appropriation
doctrine is that it "promoted the very depletion of the West's rivers
that is now a source of serious environmental concern.""
Consequently, there is virtually no water within the state's rivers and
streams available for environmental organizations to claim.
The prior appropriation doctrine exacerbates this problem by
intrinsically favoring the practice of diverting water out of a river
rather than leaving it instream. The traditional "use it or loose it"
principle demands that a user not only remove water from its course to
use.12
perfect a right but also apply the water removed to a beneficial
Historically, courts have not considered it a beneficial use to leave
water instream for environmental purposes." As such, virtually all
senior water rights in the state historically have been applied to
irrigation or other uses that require a user to remove water from its
natural course rather than leaving the water instream. Under present

8. THE NEW CACHE LA POUDRE IRRIGATING Co. & THE CACHE LA. POUDRF REsERVOIR
Co., GENERAL WATER INFORMATION: IRRIGATION WATER AND YOUR RIGHT TO USE IT, at

http://www.newcache.com/html/information/generalinfo.php
2004) [hereinafter GENERAL WATER INFORMATION].

(last visited Feb. 12,

9. COLO. WATER PROJECT, TROUT UNLIMITED, A DRY LEGACY: THE CHALLENGE FOR
COLORADO'S RIvERS 3 (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter DRY LEGACY 1].

10. Id. at 7.
11. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 261, 268-69 (2000).
12. Dentry, supranote 2; see generally Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d 798,800 (Colo. 1965).
13. The Colorado Constitution mentions certain beneficial uses, instream flows not
among them. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.,
406 P.2d at 800 ("[T]he right to the maintenance of the 'flow' of the stream is a
riparian right and is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of prior

appropriation.").
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law, therefore, some senior users are weary of temporarily converting
their rights to instream uses under lease agreements, even when they
would otherwise be so inclined, because they fear that such
conversions might deprive them of their historical use allotment. 4
Despite this hostility toward environmental concerns, the state
legislature implemented some degree of statutory override to appease
environmentalists and recreational water users. By 1973, popular
support for guardianship over minimum stream flows reached
sufficient heights to induce state legislation."5 That year, with the
threat of a citizen referendum hanging over its head, the Colorado
General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 97, codified as the Colorado
Water Right Determination Act ("WRDA")."
The bill's sponsor,
Senator Fred Anderson of Loveland, touted the legislation as a tool
that could "open the door to the state, as well as private individuals, to
begin buying up water rights for recreational and wildlife17 preservation
purposes, which [could not] be done under present law.
Under the WRDA, the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB"), a publicS entity,
possesses the sole capacity to acquire and
18
hold instream rights.
In granting this authority to CWCB, the
legislature redefined "beneficial use" to include "the appropriation by
the state of Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such
minimum flows between specific points or levels for and on natural
streams and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree." 9 Thus, CWCB may accept existing water
14. See generally Thompson, supranote 11, at 274-75.
15. Melinda Kassen, A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969,3 U. DENV.WATER L. REV.58, 61 n.24 (1999).
16. S. 97, 49th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1973) (codified at COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1973)); see also Colo.Water Conservation Bd., Colo.'s Instream
Flow Program, at http://cwcb.state.co.us/isf/Programs/isfl.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2004).
17. Richard J. Schneider, Water Appropriation Bills Introduced, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Jan. 20, 1973, at 28 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in the same year Anderson
introduced Senate Bill 97, which vested authority with the CWCB to establish
minimum stream flows. Representative Michael Strang, a fellow republican, also
introduced a constitutional amendment that would "perpetuate the same basic system
of water right appropriation [found in the state constitution] but add to the system
provisions assuring minimum stream flows and lake levels."
Id.
Under the
amendment, the legislature would have the power to set these minimum levels. For
this reason, Senator Anderson questioned the amendment, noting that this legislative
power could "turn into a political football." Id.
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-102(3) (2003).
19. § 37-92-103(4) (1990).
In the years following the adoption of the ISFP
Program, and up until the Colorado General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 156 in
2002, a precise definition of "necessary instream flows" remained somewhat elusive:
[T]he policy in Colorado... is to protect only those flows necessary to
maintain existing resources. Flows at levels that would enhance resource levels
are denied. But in practice, flows identified by the Division of Wildlife as
necessary for fish fall somewhere between what one might consider 'bare
survival' and optimum. Bare survival flows would allow survival of a small
population [of aquatic life] in the short run. Optimum flows would include
occasional vary large habitat-modifying flows.
DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A
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rights or appropriate new rights for conversion to instream use.
While this legislation can be credited for some measure of
preemptive and restorative success, many feel that the law is too
restrictive regarding the acquisition of ISF rights. In 1999, CWCB
failed to file for a single ISF right; in 2000, CWCB filed for eight; and,
in 2001, CWCB filed for just one.20 Would-be legal revisionists have
therefore argued that loosening traditional prescribed obstructions
and opening up instream water right transfers to the market economy
represents the best way to meet the "rapidly emerging market for
environmentalists, agency officials, ranchers,
farmers, and others"
2
1
interested in leasing or acquiring ISF rights.
1I1. THE COMPETING USES
A. AGRICULTURE

The agricultural stake in sustaining the state's water resources rests
on its ability to apply those resources to agrarian needs. These needs
are substantial. "In Colorado, irrigation water use (measured as
withdrawals and deliveries) accounts for more than 90% of total used
for all purposes on a state-wide basis. 22 This vast percentage of
resource allocation cannot be summarily dismissed as a wasteful use of
a public good because agriculture is one of the state's most vital
economic sectors.
Each year, Colorado's agricultural industry
accounts for approximately $4.4 billion of the state's GDP.
With the above considerations in mind, offstream users should top
the list of non-political actors involved in the policy formation process.
As Irving L. Janis has suggested, effective policy will often remain
elusive in the absence of qualified experts working in conjunction with
traditional political actors. This premise is strongly supported by the
fact that rural ranchers support and have participated in the

BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 130 (1997).
20. TROUT UNLIMITED, A DRY LEGACY 2: PROGRESS AND THE NEW THREATS IN A
DROUGHT YEAR 2, availableat

http://www.cotrout.org/CTU%20DRY%20LEGACY%2OLoRes.pdf
(Jan.
2003)
[hereinafter DRY LEGACY 2].
21. Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., Saving Our Streams Through Water Markets: A
Summary, at http://www.perc.org/publications/guidespractical/save-streams.php?s=2
(last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
22, COLO. WATER RES. RESEARCH INST., IRRIGATION WATER CONSERVATION:
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN COLORADO: A REPORT OF THE AGRICULTURAL WATER
CONSERVATION TASK FORCE 1, at

http://cwrri.colostate.edu/pubs/series/completionreport/CR19O.pdf

(Oct.

1996)

[hereinafter IRRIGATION WATER].
23. NATURAL REs. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WEATHERING TOUGH
TIMES--THE COLOR nO DROUGHT, at http://www.co.nrcs.usda.gov/news/pas/audiovisuals/weathering-tough-times.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter
WEATHERING].

24.

IRVING L. JANIS, GROUP THINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS &

FIASCOES 266-67 (2d ed. 1982).
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progressive approaches to ISF protection detailed below.15
B. URBAN EXPANSION

Presupposing that input from agricultural water users is essential to
the formation of sound conservation policy, both politics and
practicality demand that decisions regarding future ISF protection
incorporate a diverse array of concerns. As romantic as the rural
landscape and tradition may be, those practices pose very real threats
to the vitality of the state's watercourses. Fresh water is a limited
commodity; sooner or later, rivers and streams will simply go dry, or
flow so scantily that all possibilities of continued aquatic and riparian
life are foreclosed. This scenario, which is already occurring in some
areas,16 would be catastrophic to agricultural and environmental
interests alike. Continued adversity between the two camps is mutually
unconstructive.
In recent years, issues related to Colorado's urban sprawl,
particularly the accompanying need for water, have moved to the
forefront of the state policy agenda. The conflict that results when
residential and commercial developments collide-sometimes quite
literally-with rural needs is one reason growth has become such a
huge issue. As the urban infringes upon the rural, impassioned
tensions surrounding water rights commonly emerge. 7 One company
in the business of selling water rights to agrarian users noted: "As
development has moved into agricultural areas, problems have
developed concerning irrigation water. Some landowners are at odds
with ditch companies over the maintenance of ditches running
through their property. 28' The frustrations associated with population
growth also extend to efforts to preserve the natural condition of the
state's watersheds. As one recent study concluded, the expansion of
instream rights can "impair the ability of headwater communities to
meet growing demands for resorts and recreational industries." '
The problem became particularly intense within the metropolitan
area on the Front Range, most of which is encompassed by the South
Platte River Basin. Substantial population growth throughout the
South Platte Basin has made the area one of the fastest-growing
regions in the country."' Home to Denver, as well as Douglas County,
25. Dentry, supra note 2.
26. For instance, on Bear Creek, a popular foothills trout stream southwest of
Denver, suffers from warm temperatures and low flows. Rapid urban growth has
exacerbated the problem, leading to several trout kills in recent years. DRY LEGACY 2,
supra note 9, at 11.
27. For a thorough discussion on the effect of urban sprawl on Colorado's finite
water resources, see generally PETER D. NICHOLS ET AL., WATER AND GROWTH IN
COLORADO: A REVIEW OF LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES ix (Univ. of Colo. Natural Res. Law
Ctr. ed. 2001) [hereinafter WATERAND GROWTH].
28. GENERAL WATER INFORMATION, supra note 8.
29. WATER AND GROWTH, supra note 27, at x.
30. COLO. WATER RES. RESEARCH INST., COOPERATION AND COMPROMISE-A PUBLIC
PRIVATE IMPERATIVE FOR THE SOUTH PLArTE RIVER, at
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one of the fastest-growing counties in the United States, 3' the Basin
contains two-thirds of Colorado's population.n The rapid expansion
of the metropolitan region into the Eastern Plains resulted in the
conversion, between 1987 and 1997, of 1.4 million acres of agricultural
land to other uses.3 3 Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Basin's overThe
appropriated water is still applied to agricultural uses.34
agricultural users, however, no longer have the run of the land as they
once did, as competing concerns have created a political and
hydrological time bomb. Without effective communication among
those who represent developmental, agricultural, and environmental
concerns, all stand to lose.
C. CONSERVATION

Often lost in the strife between development and agriculture is the
dedicated voice of the conservationists. Because wildlife and waterway
protection offers fewer opportunities for economic gain than
development or agriculture, such environmental interests are often
dismissed as "fringe" concerns of little importance. Nevertheless, the
conservationists are not going away and will likely strengthen their
resolve as the problem escalates. As Colorado Attorney General Ken
Salazar observed: "environmental demands for water are now a part of
the radar screen for predicting the future .... These environmental
realities are now part of the legal and political landscape. Twenty-five
years ago these environmental demands were nonexistent. " 5
According to free market proponents, the creation of a market
system enables the State to both avoid impacts beyond harms to
aesthetic and ecological values and avoid fiscal downfall. Colorado
Trout Unlimited ("CTU") points out that continued reductions in
stream flows inevitably will wreak havoc upon two of the state's primary
(Dec.

http://cwrri.colostate.edu/pubs/newsletter/1996/dec/dec9622.htm

1996)

[hereinafter COOPERATION].

31. Douglas County grew by 13.6% in just a little over a year from April 2000 toJuly
2001, at which time the population was estimated to be nearly 200,000. News Release,
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Most of Nation's 10 Fastest-Growing
Counties in South, Census Bureau Reports, at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2002/cbO2-59.html (last revised Apr. 29, 2002).
32. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., SOUTH PLATTE/REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN
FACTS, at

http://cwcb.state.co.us/FactSheets/SPlatte-fs.pdf

(Mar.

2002)

[hereinafter

S.

PLATTE].
33. Coto. STATE UNW. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, SUMMARY SHEET: COLORADO DATA
FOR COOPFRATIVE EXTENSION DECADE PLANNING: REALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS, available

at http://www.ext.colostate.edu/staffres/planning/COplanningdata.pdf
Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter COOPERATIVE EXTENSION].
34. IRRIGATION WATER, supra note 22, at 1.
35.

(last revised

COOPERATION, supra note 30. Mr. Salazar, a fifth generation Coloradan from the

San Luis Valley, made this statement while still in private practice as a natural
resources attorney, two years before being elected state attorney general. Before
entering private practice, he worked as a farmer and a small business owner.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

OFFICE,

BIOGRAPHY

OF ATTORNEY

GENERAL

http://vw.ago.state.co.us/BIOAG.HTM (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).

KEN

SALAZAR,

at
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sources of recreational income: the $1.3 billion fishing industry and
the $122 million rafting industry.16 Instream flows are necessary to
protect riparian ecosystems, wildlife habitat, and, in some cases, sectors
of the state's economy. At present, however, the sole mechanism for
assuring such flows is for CWCB to unilaterally decide to exercise its
authority.
As a public agency, CWCB must remain politically responsive to
many competing interests. Additionally, budgetary constraints and
legal limitations hamper CWCB's ability to acquire ISF rights.
Moreover, the prior appropriation doctrine demands that CWCB
acquire no junior rights that would interfere with a senior right.
Because so many of Colorado's major rivers and tributaries are overappropriated, there are few, if any, surplus flows available for
appropriation. With these factors in mind, many believe the law
should be revised to enable private entities, such as CWT, to play a
more effective and meaningful role in the conservation process-in
particular, by directly utilizing funds to establish temporary ISFs
through lease agreements.37
Pigeonholing each of these interests is somewhat misleading,
however. In the quest to preserve water resources, the distinction
between agricultural and environmental interests has, in some cases,
become somewhat blurred. Across the state, agricultural associations
have begun to develop amiable, productive relationships with
environmental groups, consulting on best available irrigation practices
and technologies. At events such as the February 2003 Agricultural
Outlook Forum, for instance, "[m]any in [the agriculture] industry are
finding creative ways to adapt to changing conditions. 3' As a result,
Colorado's lead agricultural organizations and agencies are
emphasizing traditional water efficiency methods 3as9 well as exploring
new and innovative ways to manage water quantity.
One should also note that the "competing" interests involved
appear more divergent than they actually are. The conservation
community is intrinsically comprised of individuals from the very
communities that continue to demand more water for municipal use.
In those instances where the interests actually diverge, the will for
cooperation exists-the law of the state need only catch up with the
aspirations of the state's water users.

36.

News, The Forecastfor Colorado's Rivers and Streams is Dy (Colo. Rivers Alliance

Feb. 2002), at
http://www.coloradorivers.org/Resources/News/nwSG202.htm (Feb. 3, 2002).
37. COLO. WARER TRUST, INTRODUCING THE COLORADO WATER TRUST, at
http://www.coloradowatertrust.org/
38.

WEATHERING,

39.

Id.

supra note 23.

(last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
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IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: A GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL SPLITSEASON AND DRY YEAR LEASING PROGRAMS
The private acquisition concept still represents the exception to
the majority rule among the western states. As it stands, "most [ISF
protection] programs currently in place provide primarily for State
ownership of instream rights. '4 In many cases, private parties cannot
even facilitate offstream to in-stream use transactions, "[I]nstream
flow rights held by private individuals or organizations are often
As a
perceived as constraints to future water development.
consequence... most western state legislatures have authorized only
governmental agencies to hold in-place water rights under programs
that balance competing instream and consumptive uses."'"
Colorado is not alone in its continued adherence to this principle;
neighboring states also have shown a comparable dedication to
maintaining unabashed state guardianship over ISFs. Nebraska and
Wyoming follow a protocol most similar to Colorado-state agencies
retain the exclusive authority to both identify and apply for instream
use rights. 42 In Utah, two distinct agencies may apply for such rights,
the perfection of which is contingent on approval from the state
legislature.3 In Kansas, the legislature possesses the sole authority to
designate ISFs.'
While the above models remain the norm, some western states
nonetheless carved out statutory exceptions to the traditional legal
doctrines that otherwise prevent private sector involvement in the
establishment of ISFs. Particularly in the Pacific Northwest, "[b] uying
5
the region
water for instream flows ...is no longer a novel concept,"M
has been cited as the "leader in the free-market approach to increasing
stream flows. 46 Unlikely is it a mere coincidence that those states that
have chosen to embrace water markets are geographically clustered in
the Northwest. The sweeping introduction of private instream flow
transfers to the region's market economy is often attributed to the
need to protect decreasing salmon runs, particularly in the Columbia

40. Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospectsfor PrivateInstream Water
Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENvrL. L. 203, 203 (1997).
41. Steven J. Shupe & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Recognizing the Value of In-Place Uses
of Water in the West: An Introduction to the Laws, Strategies, and Issues, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at 1-9 to 1-10 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds.,
rev. ed. 1993).
42. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 121-22 tbl.5.1.
43. Id. at 122 tbl.5.1.
44. Id. at 121 tbl.5.1.
45. CLAY LANDRY, Abstract, POL. ECONOMY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTREAM FLOW
MARKETING IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 1 (July 1998),
at http://www.pnrec.org/1998/papers/clandry.pdf.
46. Id. See also Shupe & MacDonnell, supra note 41, at 1-10 ("Despite the fact that
several western legislatures have explicitly prohibited the creation of in-place water
rights held by the private sector, individuals and organizations in some other western
states are asserting this appropriation strategy.").
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River Basin.47 In addition, states in the Northern Pacific typically
experience greater precipitation than the High and Central Plains
states.
As such, farmers and ranchers are more likely to hold
expendable stream flows then their neighbors to the south.44
Although Colorado's climate is both significantly more arid than
the Northwest and devoid of salmon stocks, a water leasing scheme is
not necessarily unsuitable for Colorado. Any such program, however,
needs to address the particulars of the state's economy, geography,
and most importantly, its existing legal framework. Leases to instream
rights in the Northwest are often funded through the economic
benefits garnered from improved salmon populations. 9 Similarly, the
approximately $8.5 billion 0 brought into Colorado's economy each
year from recreational expenditures could conceivably subsidize
broader acquisition rates.
Of course, the imposition of an instream right leasing system
would inevitably displace a certain degree of agricultural production in
the state. By definition, water left instream is not applied to cropland,
livestock needs, or other offstream uses. Increasing the value of water
for municipal and non-agricultural uses, however, already has this
effect, since water districts in more populous areas routinely outbid
farmers and ranchers.5 A leasing system allows farmers and ranchers
to cut their losses while maintaining their permanent rights to the
water they cannot or decide not to use. A former Colorado governor
noted the economic benefits of instream flows almost twenty years ago.
[I] n a 1985 water policy speech by then-governor Richard Lamm of
Colorado, the wisdom of perpetuating historic water uses at the
expense of instream values was questioned. To emphasize this point,
the governor stated that alfalfa, which consumes 27 percent of
Colorado's water, injected only $156 million/year into the state's
economy, while recreation and tourism accounted for more than $4
billion in annual statewide benefit. 2
As the governor suggested, the state holds a vested interestbeyond catering to special interest groups-in preserving natural flows
in its streams and rivers. Leaving water instream not only enables the
preservation of ecologically vital resources, but also serves an
invaluable fiscal purpose. By granting current users the ability to lease
their rights to those users who would apply the rights to instream use,
the state would be taking a step toward insuring a financially sound
future. As the state witnessed in the months following the devastating
47. See, e.g., Landry, supra note 45, at 3. "[A] 1997 Oregonian newspaper poll
showed that the decline of salmon constitutes the number one environmental concern
in the state." ERIN SCHILLER, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE OREGON WATER TRUST, at
http://www.cei.org/gencon/025,01354.cfm (Nov. 1, 1998).

48.
49.
50.

GILLILAN& BROWN, supra note 19, at 99.
See LANDRY, supra note 45, at 3.
COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, supra note 33, at 2.

51.
52.

See generally Shupe & MacDonnell, supra note 41, at 1-2 to 1-4.
Id. at 1-2 to 1-3.
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2002 forest fires, the condition of Colorado's natural environment is
inexorably tied to its economy. Moreover, private ISF leasing would
allow financially strapped agricultural users to apply their rights in the
manner they see fit and to their greatest benefit.
A. SPLIT-SEASON AND DRY-YEAR LEASES

Within the broader context of instream right leasing, two
innovative techniques-split-season and dry-year leasing-have arisen.
The two practices are similar, yet distinct in a number of ways: "A 'splitseason' lease allows a portion of a water right to be used for irrigation
during mid-summer," while the remaining portion is left instream
"during critical periods when fish are migrating and spawning., 5' A
"dry-year" lease, on the other hand, provides an occasional water
transfer from offstream to instream use depending on weather
patterns and local flow conditions. 4 Both approaches have been cited
as valuable tools not only for those users who would prefer a direct
return on their right but also for water users who are at risk of
forfeiting their water rights due to non-use.55
1. Split-Season Leases
Structurally, split-season water leases are generally similar to the
commonplace lease contract. If an owner decides to temporarily forgo
a possessive right during a specified part of the year, the owner conveys
that right to a willing lessee whose use of the right is more valuable
than the conveyors. In this sense, split-season rights are built not only
upon a free-market mentality, but also on notions of practicality. For
instance, the first private lease executed in Montana established a tenyear split-season agreement through which eight landowners agreed to
let 1.3 cubic feet per second ("cfs") flow past a diversion dam for six
months of each year.55 In return for the seasonal conversion to
instream use, Montana Trout Unlimited ("MTU") paid for the removal
of an unwanted diversion dam on the creek." This agreement, as
many others like it, demonstrates the possibilities for innovation and
coexistence of divergent interests when free-market acquisition
techniques are made possible.
Absent the strongly established tenets of prior appropriation, split-

53.

WASH. DEPT. OF ECOLOGY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WASHINGTON WATER

ACQUISITION PROGRAM, at http://ww.ecy.wa/gov/pubs/0211013.pdf (Nov. 2002).
54.

Id.

55.

OR. WATER RES. DEP'T, RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT DIVISION:

STAFF STRUCTURE,

ORGANIZATION, AND TOOLS 3,

at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/pdfs/rmd.reorg.pdf (last visited April 13,
2004).
56. Clay J. Landry & Clint Peck, Dealingfor Water: Western States Are Creating Water
Markets Without Compromising the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, MONTANA FARMERSTOCKMAN (Dec. 1998), retpinted in OR. WATER TRUST, OWT IN THE MEDIA,

at http://www.owt.org/owtmedia.html#anc-mtfarm.
57. Id.
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season leases would probably occur routinely and without much
fanfare. Prior appropriation controls western water law, however, and
presents obstacles to these otherwise appealing transactional
arrangements. The first problem is that water rights in a prior
appropriation system are not akin to personal property rights. In
Colorado, the state constitution clearly states that the waters of the
state are the property of the public. 8 Thus, the State must ensure that
one individual's exercise of a use right does not infringe upon
another's similar right. In the context of prior appropriation, splitseason rights give rise to some interesting problems. These issues are
addressed in Section IV.
2. Dry Year Leases
The attractiveness of dry-season leases is the ease of acquiring
agricultural water on a short term, emergency basis. In a state such as
Colorado, where free-market acquisitions remain relatively untested,
agricultural users generally feel weary of transactions that may impair a
permanent use right. The dry-season alternative thus has great
appeal.' While generally long-term and predictable, the terms of dryyear leases nonetheless call for intermittent, rather than permanent
transfers.r1 The State of Washington-which has taken progressive
measures, in law if not in practice, toward more permissible private
acquisitions-recognizes three distinct types of dry-year lease
arrangements:
Under an "insurance" dry-year lease, a water-right holder or
lessor is paid a yearly amount as insurance against the possibility that
a dry year will occur. In a dry year, lessors agree not to use the water
and receive a yearly insurance payment whether there is a dry year or
not. Some versions use one-time rather than yearly payments against
the occurrence of a dry year. A trigger event such as stream flow
levels, precipitation, snowpack, runoff or storage must be identified
to provide an objective basis for determining when the lease is
exercised.
Under the "option" dry-year lease, a contract agreement provides
an option where a lessee has first call of the water in a dry year and
the water-right holder receives a payment, regardless of whether
there is a dry year or not. An option payment is made either at the
initiation of the contract or annually to ensure that a valid contract
exists. An additional payment is made, however, when the lessee
exercises the dry-year option, usually at a predetermined price. With
an option lease, the trigger is less important because the lease will be
58. COLO. CoNST. art. XVI, § 5.
59. ADRYLEGACY2, supra note 20, at 6.
60. For a specific discussion on the history of fear associated with the loosening of
instream acquisition rules, see GILLILAN & BROwN, supra note 19, at 123.
61.

WATER RES. PROGRAM, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON WATER

AcQuISTON PROGRAM: FINDING WATER To RESTORE STREAMS 2 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/Images/strategy/stratl pdf
[hereinafter FINDING WATER].
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paid only when use of the water by the lessee is necessary.
Another version, the "predictive" dry-year lease, was developed
by the Oregon Water Trust for a dry-land irrigator to run over a 10year period. The trust and farmer determined that on average
irrigation was needed three out of 10 years. A contract between the
trust and the irrigator included an up-front payment for forgoing
irrigation when it would have been needed (three out of the 10 years)
and water was donated for the other seven years. As a result, the
61
contract essentially required the irrigator not to irrigate for 10 years.
The diversity represented among the split- and dry-season
approaches demonstrates the creativity possible when water users with
varying objectives have the opportunity to craft their own solutions to
water management issues without legal hindrances. At times, the
entirety of a right may be leased for the duration of lease with the right
holder diverting no water during the lease period. These types of
arrangements are less common than the split- or dry-season
Most instream lease rights are conveyed under splitalternatives.
season agreements. 3 However, when permitted, the dry-year-option
ISF
approach is most common, and, in addition to its use in
'
protection, is "increasingly used to enhance municipal supplies."1
Aside from the split-season/dry-season distinction, instream leases
may provide for either a long- or short-term transfer of rights. For
instance, during a severe drought, a water user may enter a one-season
lease to head-off the permanent destruction of a fishery. As discussed
in Section V. below, Colorado recently passed legislation that allows
state acquisition of ISFs in a manner reminiscent of dry-year leasing.
As the legislation is written, such leases are not meant to provide
permanent benefit to habitually low-flowing rivers and streams, but are
meant as a stop-gap measure in times of severe drought. In Oregon,
recent legislation providing for short-term leases was intended to
complement the existent program that allowed long-term leases. In
or constant-are
most cases, ISF leases-split-season, dry-season,
66
renewable for given periods, but not indefinitely.
B. How LEASE ACQUISITIONS ARE FACILITATED: TWO PROGRESSIVE
STATE MODELS

The Oregon and Montana models illustrate similarities and
differences in ISF programs. The marked similarities begin with the
fact that both Montana and Oregon have long overcome prior
appropriation's traditional prohibition against recognizing ISFs as a
beneficial use. Second, each state has taken measures to secure senior

62. Id.
63. See generally MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS, 2002 ANNUAL PROGRESS
app. A (2002) [hereinafter FWP PROGRESS REPORT].
64. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 147.
65. See discussion infra Section V.
66. FINDING WATER,.supra note 61, at 1-2.
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priority dates of such rights when conveyed through lease
The two programs are distinguishable by their
agreements.1 7
receptiveness to private sector involvement in the offstream-toinstream water right conversion process.0 This is particularly true
insofar as such conversions are accomplished through lease
agreements. Finally, each state has received extensive praise for both
implementing and expanding pioneering ISF protection frameworks.69
The fact that the two programs are commonly viewed as successes by
both agricultural water users and environmentalists ensures that both
may aptly contribute to an adaptable blueprint for agenda setting in
states such as Colorado.
While either the Montana or Oregon framework alone would
provide a strong argument in favor of expanding ISF leasing
opportunities, an appraisal of the two different approaches offers
further benefits. First, a comparison of the programs demonstrates
the flexibility possible in the policy development and legal evolution
processes-even when only one relatively specific strategy is employed.
Second, the values protected-and the needs served-vary somewhat
between the two subject states. By examining these contrasting
purposes, however, a better case can be made that leasing approaches
may feasibly incorporate any number of values the ISF proponent
seeks to protect. Finally, the histories, procedures, and limitations of
the two programs differ in many respects. There is value purely in
examining these differences, as they serve as an indication of the best
means of policy formulation and implementation.
1. Montana: The Journey Toward Private Acquisition
a. History and Statutory Construction
The Montana Supreme Court developed an "activist approach"
towards interpreting environmental provisions within its constitution
in the late twentieth century. 7° The elements defining this movement
represent a profound departure from the traditional environmental
activism that spurned the promulgation of limitless state and federallyimposed regulation over the last three decades. Whereas regulatory
initiatives generally seek constraint and sacrifice among competing
interests, Montana's "new activism," and its embracing freely
transferable rights tends toward cooperation, non-conflict, and mutual
67. Matthew J. McKinney, lnstream Flow Policy in Montana: A History and Blueprintfor
the Future, in INSTRFAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at 15-1, 15-29 (Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993); Michael J. Mattick, Instream Flow
Protection in Oregon, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at 18-1, 18-1 (Lawrence
J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
68. Compare McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-31, with Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-1.
69. See McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-1, 15-29 to 15-30; see Mattick, supra note 67, at
18-1 to 18-2, 18-9.
70. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and
Future ofMontana's
EnvironmentalProvisions,64 MoNT. L. REv. 157, 159 (2003).
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benefit." Assuming such political leanings and considering Montana's
vast reaches of pristine-yet threatened-river and stream flows, the
state was the quintessential breeding ground for a conservation
strategy that rejects traditional command and control approaches to
environmental protection, and has embraced free-market principles.
Montana's ISF program embodies a unique appeal, attributable to
its collaborative roots. Nevertheless, the Montana model warrants a
closer look for reasons beyond the fact that it represents a product of
divergent interests forging a common solution. Today, the Montana
model stands as "one of the most progressive sets of instream flow
protection laws in the Western United States," and "[a] mong the arid
Rocky Mountain states, Montana has the most extensive and flexible
The Montana experiment
instream flow protection regime. 7'
provides a useful starting point not only for evaluating strategies of
cooperative effort, but also in discerning what principles and
approaches Colorado water users, conservationists, and legislators
might rely upon in creating a more legally and politically receptive
atmosphere for water leasing.
State efforts aimed at protecting ISFs in Montana began in 1969,
when the state legislature enacted laws allowing the state Fish and
Game Commission to file for "Murphy Rights" on the unappropriated
waters of twelve "blue ribbon" trout streams." The legislature defined
these rights simply: those streamflows necessary for the preservation of
fish and wildlife habitat.74 In 1973, the State passed the more
aggressive Montana Water Use Act, through which the state or federal
government may acquire a water reservation in order to maintain a
The act only 76applied to
minimum flow, level,
.... or quality of water."
certain enumerated basins and for determinate durations. Thus, at
the time, only the State, or some political subdivision of the state
(interpreted to include the federal government), could apply to the
Board of Natural Resources to reserve water for instream uses.' No
state law allowed for the conversion of an out-of-stream right to an
°
instream use.
Over the next fourteen years, the state achieved incremental
progress in the development of its ISF protection program. In 1987,
for example, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation ("DNRC") instituted a new policy whereby potentially
affected water users were offered more involvement in departmental

71. See generally id. at 157-73 (explaining Montana's constitutional provisions
regarding the environment).
72. Memorandum from Laura Ziemer, Director, Trout Unlimited's Montana Water
Project, to Dave White, NRCS State Conservationist (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with the
University of Denver Water Law Review) [hereinafter Ziemer Memorandum].
73. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-4.
74. Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 345, 1969 Mont. Laws 879-81.
75. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-4 to 15-5.
76. See id. at 15-4 to 15-7.
77. Id. at 15-5.
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decisions concerning changes of use. T8 With the passage of this
legislation, universal involvement in the policy and managerial process
became a central and long-standing theme to Montana's water
management approach, as it remains today.7 9 The passage of Senate
Bill 447 in 1988 marked another important development in Montana's
ISF program. 0
Senate Bill 447 struck a compromise between
conflicting conservation and agricultural users by assigning a priority
date for state-held instream rights upon the submission of a qualified
agency's notice to convert rights to instream use."
While the preceding developments did ensure the preservation of
some natural stream flows, the provisions failed both to introduce a
market element to state acquisitions and to open up the instream
acquisition game to interested private parties. All instream rights were
the result of new appropriations by the State, rather than bargaining
between the State and private entities, or among private entities
themselves.
In 1989, the Montana legislature passed a statute allowing the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks ("MFWP") to acquire lease
82
rights for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing stream flows.
The 1989 leasing statute was considered "the most controversial, and
perhaps the most far-reaching spin-off of the state water plan. 33 One
observer noted that the original proposal to establish a voluntary
instream acquisition program in Montana "created a public
controversy seldom seen in the halls of the Capitol."8'4 Why did the
introduction of a bill touted as mutually beneficial to both agrarian
and environmental interests set off such a firestorm; how were tensions
quelled to such an extent as to not only uphold the program, but in
fact expand it?
To begin, the bill the state eventually adopted was a shadow of the
bill as originally proposed. Pressure from agricultural interests caused
vast modifications to the proposed legislation before both houses and
the governor agreed to enact it.1 In hopes of appeasing all interests,
DNRC fashioned a working group comprised of the Montana Water
Resources Association, the stock growers association, the association of
conservation districts, the Montana Farm Bureau, the Montana
Wildlife Federation, and the Montana Council of Trout Unlimited"
While initial discussion centered on allowing private sales and
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 15-21.
See id. at 15-21.
Id. at 15-24.
Id. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-316(9) (a) (2003).
82. LANDRY, supra note 45, at 2.
83. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-28.
84. Thompson, supra note 11, at 274 (quoting MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH,

WILDLIFE

&

PARKS, FISHERIES DIVISION, ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT: WATER LEASING STUDY

1999, at 2 (Dec. 1999).
85. POLICY CONSENSUS INITIATIVE, PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS IN MONTANA 2, at
http://www.policyconsensus.org/casestudies/pdfs/MT streams.pdf (Feb. 2004).
86. Id.
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purchases, the group-ultimately realizing that in-fee transfers would
be unacceptable to some of the agricultural interests representedinstead focused on a leasing approach .
The Montana Consensus Council ("MCC"), a state entity charged
with mediating the disputes that arose in the drafting process,
declared the working group an abounding success. Interestingly, the
MCC attributed the group's success, at least in part, to the fact that
"key decision makers with a potential interest in the issue
(representatives of the governor, legislature and state agencies) were
not invited to the table. . Only the affected stakeholders crafted the
groundwork legislation that presently guides Montana's ISF
protection. The final bill called for a temporar "leasing study," with a
The success of the
sunset provision ten years after its passage.program, however, prompted the legislature to renew its terms in
1999. Thus, leases may be acquired under the temporary program
untilJune 30, 2009.90
Originally, the State or its approved subdivisions could lease rights
only within five particular basins for the maintenance or enhancement
of streamflows for fisheries." An irrigator could also lease water rights
to MFWP in order to improve fishing conditions." Initiation of the
program thus "provide[d] an opportunity for all affected interests in
the state to study and evaluate the social, economic, and
environmental impacts of transferring water from traditional uses to
The subsequent legislation that increased the
instream uses. ' '
number of stream reaches upon which leases could be acquired from
an original five to ten in 1991 and to twenty in 1993 evidenced the
success of the program.9 4 Today, MFWP is statutorily authorized to
apply for leases on up to forty stream reaches in the state.9 ' For the
most part, however, the state limited its acquisition efforts to small
leases. As of 1998, no state lease called for leaving more than 2,000
acre-feet of water instream.99
results,
study produced positive
Although
the leasing
environmentalists recognized the need for private sector participation
in one form or another. Water attorney Jack Sterne detailed the
events leading to the 1995 expansion of the temporary study allowing
private sector participation;
The bill was the culmination of six years of work on the part of
instream advocates. Other bills that would have allowed the purchase
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 2 (internal quotation omitted).
89. Act of March 31, 1995, ch. 322, 1995 Mont. Laws 990.
90. MoNT. CODEANN. §§ 85-2-436(4), -437, -438 (2003).
91. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-29.
92. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-436(2)(b) (2003).
93. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-29.
94. Id.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2437(3) (2003).
96. LANDRY, supra note 45, at 10.
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or lease of existing ights... were introduced in both the 1991 and
1993 sessions of the Montana Legislature but failed to attract
adequate support. The difference in 1995 was that instream flow
advocates worked with agricultural and development interests to ease
fears about creating a private market for instream rights. Agricultural
and development interests opposed the bill in the beginning, but
they later realized that an alternative citizen initiative could produce
a stronger piece of legislation. After polls in Montana showed broad
public support for such a measure, agricultural and development
groups decided that they would rather work with environmentalists
than risk a major overhaul of water rights laws through the initiative
process. The opposing groups [again] brought in a professional
mediation service to help broker a deal. As part of the resulting
compromise, instream advocates agreed to limit the bill to leasing
because agricultural interests were philosophically opposed to an
ownership statute that
they believed might permanently remove water
rights from the land. 97
Sterne's final statement regarding appurtenance is important.
Water rights in Montana are, and always have been, attached to the
lands they serve. Accordingly, the temporal nature of water leasing
helps to ensure rights remain appurtenant. Although conservation
groups may have preferred the security of purchase acquisitions, the
establishment of a leasing program helped to appease agricultural
users while advancing many of the objectives conservation groups
sought through ownership. The compromise, in conjunction with the
accomplishments achieved through the original leasing program,
eased much of the apprehension agricultural users held toward private
sector involvement. Today, Montana authorizes private individuals
and entities of any kind to lease water for instream purposes for up to
ten years, and in particular instances, thirty years.8
b. Legal and Procedural Requirements
Montana law currently provides three means to convert an existing
consumptive use water right to instream use. A person may convert
the right to an instream use without a lease, lease all or a portion of a
water right to MFWP, or lease the water to another party who holds the
right to benefit a threatened fishery. 9 This section does not address
the first option; it is irrelevant to leasing strategies. To date, most
leases in Montana are established under the second option, in concert
with MFWP.'t8 However, private organizations such as MTU and the
97.
98.
99.

Sterne, supra note 40, at 211-12.
Thompson, supra note 11, at 287; MoNTr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436(2) (f) (2003).
MONTANA DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, WATER RIGHTS
MONTANA 18 (Dec. 2001), at http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/home.htm.
100. Id. The statute provides:
The state, any political subdivision or agency of the state, or the United States
or any agency of the United States may apply to the department to acquire a
state water reservation for existing or future beneficial uses or to maintain a
minimum flow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at periods or
for a length of time that the department designates.
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newly created Montana Water Trust actively participate in the lease
acquisition process and have rigorously pursued ISF lease rights in
numerous river basins across the state.
The procedural requirements for public and private acquisitions
are quite similar-most importantly, the "beneficial use" requirements
in a private acquisition are the same as State-acquired leases in that
acquisitions must "restore and enhance streamflows to benefit
Montana's native fish species.",1 2 However, private organizations
receive more leeway than MFWP; unlike MFWP, private organizations
may obtain lease rights in any river basin in which willing lessors exist.
Furthermore, private entities do not need to maintain political
responsiveness. These facts alone open up leasing opportunities for
conservation organizations in areas where MFWP would otherwise be
precluded from acting.
(Temporary) Water leasing study - State leasing
Under the 1989-authorized temporary leasing study, "[t]he
department of fish, wildlife, and parks, with the consent of the [Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks Commission], may lease existing rights for the
purpose of maintaining or enhancing streamflows for the benefit of
fisheries in [designated] stream reaches.. .

.",'

MFWT "may declare a

stream eligible for leasing ...only if it finds that water leasing is
necessary to maintain or enhance streamflows for fisheries.1 4
Presently, leases may not be issued to MFWP for a term of more than
ten years unless the water to be leased is considered "salvaged" waterwater made available for leasing through the application of watersaving methods such as ditch lining or improved irrigation practices.' °5
If the subject water meets the definition of salvaged water, the State
may approve a lease to convert the saved amount to instream purposes
for up to thirty years. 0 6 Whereas traditional law in prior appropriation
this statutory
states tends to discourage salvaging projects,"
construction provides a strong incentive for users to integrate watersaving measures into their use practices.
MFWP initiates the leasing process by filing an application for a
temporary change with DNRC.'O' The required form is a standard
MONT. CODE ANN.
101.

§ 85-2-316(1) (2003).

MONTANA WATER TRUST, INSTREAM FLow ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK: WORKING

TO BENEFIT STRFAMFLOWS AND WATER RIGHT HOLDERS 5 (n.d.)
[hereinafter INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK].
102. Id.
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2436(2) (b) (2003).
104. Id. § 85-2-437(2).
105. Id. §§ 85-2-436(2) (f), 102(16).
106. Id. § 85-2436(2) (f).
107. This is particularly the case in Colorado, where the state supreme court has
expressly held that water saved through salvaging initiatives, for example by removing
phreatophytes from one's land, is "subject to call by prior appropriators" and thus
must "return from whence it comes-the river-and thereon ... to those the river
feeds in turn." See Southeastern Colo.Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc.,
529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974).
108. See MONTANA DEP'T OF NATURAL RES. AND CONSERVATION, FORM 606: APPLICATION
COOPERATELY
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change of use application, the same application that an offstream
agricultural user would file when seeking a change in point of
diversion, type of [other offstream] use, or place of use.' ° The
application carries a $400 filing fee and must specify, among other
things, the amount of water involved, the purpose of the change, and
the proposed method of measuring the carriage rate involved in the
transaction.1 ° In addition, a valid application must include a detailed
map of the stream reach involved.111
After a preliminary review of the change application, DNRC must
serve notice of the application to potentially affected parties including:
(1) an appropriator of water or applicant for or holder of a permit
who, according to [DNRC records], may be affected by the proposed
appropriation;
(2) any purchaser. .. of property that, according to the records of
the department, may be affected by the proposed appropriation; and
(3) any public agency that has reserved waters in the [area]. 1 2
After notifying the above parties, DNRC must publish notice of the
1
pending change in a locally circulated newspaper."
The notice must
indicate all "facts pertinent to the application ' 14 to alert any
potentially affected water users whom DNRC did not directly inform of
the proposed change.
The extensive notice requirements provide a strong safeguard
against harm to downstream users not party to the lease transaction.
As previously mentioned, Montana was careful not to expand its ISF
protection strategies at the expense of the prior appropriation
doctrine's no harm rule. As such, change applications do not receive
ultimate approval until MFPAT overcomes all objections filed with
DNRC pursuant to the statute."' DNRC, in turn, reserves the right to
"modify or revoke the lease authorization if an appropriator, other
than one involved in the initial change of use proceeding, proves by
substantial credible evidence that his water right is adversely
affected. ''1 6
Leases involving conversions from offstream use to instream flow
may be renewed once for an additional ten years." 7 Upon submission

TO

CHANGE

A

WATER

RIGHT,

Aug.

2003,

http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/home.htm [hereinafter FORM 606].

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. MONT.CODEANN. § 85-2-307(1) (b) (2003).
113. Id. § 8 5-2-307(1)(a).

114. Id.
115. Id. §§ 85-2-308,-436(2) (c).
116. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-30.
117. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2436(2) (a),

(f).

available

at
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of a renewal request, however, DNRC must alert any user who may be
adversely affected by the renewal." 8 This alert may trigger objections
from users claiming potential harm, and therefore may re-initiate the
process described above. Those leases involving water made available
from the development of water conservation or storage projects are
restricted to a term equal to the expected life of the project but not
T19
more than thirty years.
Each year, MFWP must compile a comprehensive report on all new
In fact, in drafting the 1989
and existing ISF lease holdings.2
legislation, the state senate viewed the creation of ISF lease rights as
pressing enough to compel MFWP to provide, in the annual report,
convincing justification for its failure to establish such rights if no new
lease agreements are established throughout the year.'
Recognizing the overriding importance of seniority in the prior
appropriation system, the legislation also specifically indicates that
"[t]he priority of appropriation for a lease ... is the same as the
priority of appropriation of the right that is leased.",22 This clause
ensures that waters left instream under lease agreements are protected
from claims by competing users and that leased waters have
appropriation dates established at the time of the lease execution.
For comparative purposes, MFWP performs a function similar to
CWCB. Both are the sole state agency entrusted with the ability to
acquire existing water rights for conversion to instream uses.
However, MFWP, unlike CWCB, actively pursues leased rights. The
dissimilarity reflects under Montana law transfers to ISF use are limited
to lease agreements under the state's temporary leasing study; no
provisions allow for outright government purchases of ISF rights.
MFWP's stated mission is
However, the distinction may exist because
12
3
more conservation oriented than CWCB's
(Temporary) Changes in appropriationrights - Private leasing
Notwithstanding the fact that permanent ISF conveyances are
prohibited in Montana, the state's 1989 statutory components parallel
Colorado's ISF protection framework in structure, if not in practice.
However, Montana's 1995 amendments signify a considerable
departure from such "traditional" methods of publicly administrated
ISF establishment approaches. The 1995 legislation carved out two

118. Id. § 85-2-436(2)(f).
119. Id.
120. ld. § 85-2436(3) (a); see, e.g., FWP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63.
121. Id. § 85-2-436(3) (a).
122. Id. § 85-2-436(2) (h).
123. Whereas Montana FWP's stated mission is to provide "for the stewardship of the
fish, wildlife, parks and recreational resources of Montana, while contributing to the
quality of life for present and future generations," CWCB directives extend well
beyond such conservationist notions. FWP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63. In
addition to facilitating and holding ISF rights, CWCB is also charged with the
development of the waters of the state, which in practice includes the financing and
oversight of out-of-stream diversion projects. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-121 to -125
(2003).
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significant exceptions to historical prohibitions against converting
existing water rights to instream uses. First, it allowed existing users to
unilaterally convert their consumptive uses to ISFs on a temporary
basis without transferring the right to a public entity through a
purchase or lease agreement1 4 Second, and for conservationists most
importantly, the legislation opened the door to private transactions
between existing users and non-profit conservation groups.15
Montana's expanded program now allows private persons to enter
lease agreements with existing users; the existing user is able to change
a consumptive use to an instream use through whatever terms the
lessor and lessee
agree upon in return for compensation from the
2,
private lessee.1
The statutory language defines "person" broadly, and any
"individual, association, partnership, or corporation" may lease 1 water
7
2
for instream enhancement providing certain conditions are met.
Although MTU has been the most active lessor of ISF rights in the
years since the legislation's passage, other organizations have begun to
These
vigorously pursue lease rights in the state as well. 2
organizations receive considerable leeway regarding the leasing
methods at their disposal. Rather than specifying split- or dry-season
leasing methods, the statute allows considerable room for flexibility,
stating that a change of use approval may be granted for either
"consecutive or intermittent use [s].""9
To reiterate, all changes to instream use in Montana must be
temporary. For all practical purposes, then, the conversions are "lease
agreements" because-as with transactions involving MFWP-the law
"authorizes private individuals.., to lease water for [only] up to ten
Like leases entered under the
years for instream purposes. "' 3 .
temporary leasing study, temporary changes of use are renewable for
up to ten years upon mutual agreement between the contracting
parties.'
The program originally terminated in 2005, but its success
prompted the state legislature to extend its terms effective upon its
original termination date ofJuly 2005. 2
In 2005, private entities will also be able to broker longer-term ISF
deals with those willing to make improvements to their diversionary,
irrigation, or storage practices. At that time, statutory authorization
becomes effective and allows private organizations to enter lease
agreements for up to thirty years with appropriators who possess
124. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-408(2) (a) (i) (2003).
125. Id. § 85-2408(2)(a)-(b).
126. Id. § 85-2-408(2)(a) (ii).
127. Id. § 85-2408(b).
128. The Montana Water Trust, for instance, recently acquired a lease right for 300
acre-feet per year. Telephone Interview with John Ferguson, Director, Montana Water
Trust (July 9, 2003) [hereinafter Ferguson Interview].
129. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-407(2) (2003).
130. Id. §§ 85-2-407 to -409; Thompson, supra note 11, at 287.
131. Id. § 85-2-407(3).
132. Id. § 85-2-407.
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surplus water made "available from the development of new water
conservation or storage project development."' l1 Again, provisions of
this type weaken historical disincentives to salvaging while encouraging
irrigators to develop creative conservation strategies.
Procedurally, private interests must comport with guiding legal
language similar to the language governing the establishment of
publicly held lease rights. Like those established through MFWP, all
leases entered under the 1995 statute must benefit fisheries and must
demonstrably not inflict harm upon non-party users. 4 The same
"Application to Change a Water Right" form must be filed with
DNRC. 31 5 After DNRC determines the application is complete, the
water right sought to be changed is "subject to a critical and intense
review" even before notice of the proposed change is published.'3
Upon publication of notice, water users adverse to the use change may
submit objections to DNRC1 37 Those opposed to the change may also
object during a renewal process and once during the term of the
Contingent on whether the change request
change permit.'"
overcomes such objections, DNRC may grant or deny the parties'
request to enter the lease agreement."" Nevertheless, if it approves a
lease, DNRC reserves the right to modify or revoke its authorization if
it determines that others' rights are adversely affected by the change at
any point.r 0
Perhaps the most important aspect of Montana's statutory
framework is "the ability to change the purpose of an irrigationwater
right to an instream water right, and retain the priority date of the
original water right."14 1 As with State-held lease rights, "[tihe priority
of appropriation for a temporary change in appropriation right is the
same as the priority of appropriation of the right that is temporarily
changed."

42

Again,

conservationists

adamantly

fought

for

the

inclusion of a provision guaranteeing that appropriation dates would
remain unaffected by temporary transfers of rights or changes in use.
Since the 1988 passage of Senate Bill 447,141 maintaining the seniority
of ISF rights has remained a paramount concern to those seeking to
establish and preserve ISF rights in Montana, a concern that gained
victory in the letter of the law.

133. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 85-2-407(9) (2001) (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-407
(1979)).
134. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-408(3) (a)-(b) (2003).
135. See FORM 606, supra note 108.
136. INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 43.

137.
138.
139.

MONT. CODE ANN.

Id. at 43-44.

§ 85-2-407(4)(b) (2003).
McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-29.
§ 85-2-407(4)

140.

MONT. CODE ANN.

141.

Ziemer Memorandum, supra note 72.

142.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 85-2-407(5)

(a) (2003).
(2001).

143. Codified at § 85-2-316(9) (establishing methods for determining priority of
appropriation).
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2. The Oregon Water Trust: Innovator in Private Facilitation
a. History and Statutory Construction
Oregon is commonly identified as the first state to proactively seek
to protect ISFs when, in 1915, it took measures to protect natural
stream flows along the Columbia River Gorge.' 44 Since that time, the
rules governing streamflow protection have witnessed tremendous
evolution; in 1955, Oregon became the first state to establish a
minimum stream flow program, and in 1970, it created the Scenic
Waterways program, which-by its very nature-serves to maintain
healthy stream flows.14
Oregon's aggressive approach to river and
stream protection lives on today, as the state "continues to lead the
development of instream flow markets" in the West.' 6
Oregon's current ISF protection scheme was solidified in 1987 with
the passage of Senate Bill 140.147 Building on Oregon's progressive
history of instream protection, the new legislation authorized any
person, public or private, to "purchase or lease all or a portion of an
48
existing water right ... for conversion to an in-stream water right.'
This transfer of private rights was considered "critical.. . because it
offered the only route for an in-stream water right to obtain a valuable
senior priority date."'49 The other water right transfer methods in the
bill could not offer priority dates prior to 1955.'5
On overappropriated rivers and streams, such junior appropriation dates
would fail to guarantee the actual preservation of necessary minimum
flows in dry years when senior right holders could conceivably divert
water beyond the full call of the river. 5'
Though private ISF purchase acquisitions are lawful and not
uncommon in the state, Oregon specifically recognized the right to
lease water for instream purposes with the passage of the 1987
legislation. 52 Amendments to the statute in May 2001, however,
moved beyond mere authorization and specified that use of a water
right could be "split" between the lessor and the lessee within a given
calendar year.' 53 To date, the only requirements for split-season
leasing are that (1) the original right holder must refrain from
144.
145.

GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 137. See also Sterne, supra note 40, at 212.
GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 137; Sterne, supra note 40, at 212.

146.

CLAY

J.

LANDRY,

POL. ECONOMY

RESEARCH

CENTER, SAVING OUR STREAMS

THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A PRACrICAL GUIDE 32 (1998).
147. S. 140, 64th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1987) (codified at OR. REv. STAT. §
537.332-360 (1987)).
148. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.348(1) (2001).
149. Janet C. Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading Into the Water Market: The First
Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 135, 138 (1999).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mattick, sufira note 67, at 18-4.
153. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3) (2001). See also Oregon: Water Resources Department
Adopts New Rules Addressing Split-season Leasingfor Instream Use, 6 W. WATER L. & POL'Y
REP. 100, 101 (Feb. 2002).
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diverting water out of stream while water is concurrently left instream
under the lease agreement, and (2) the parties to the transaction must
measure the amount of water applied to each use and report the data
to the Oregon Water Resources Department ("OWRD") on an annual
basis. 1 4 Although not expressly allowed under the statute, dry-season
leasing would not appear to offend the broad statutory language that
allows leasing of "all or a portion of the existing water right ... for a
specified period. '"'' Dry-season leases merely specify lease periods with
regard to natural conditions rather than time.
The majority of states that allow ISF right transactions do so only
when special circumstances exist on the proposed reach of a river or
stream. In Montana, parties may enter lease agreements only when
15 6
doing so will demonstrably benefit or enhance a recognized fishery.
In Colorado, environmentalists have long decried a system that (until
recently)157 restricted CWCB from obtaining any rights other than
those that would maintain "the minimum flow necessary to protect the
natural environment to a reasonable degree. ' '58
Oregon, however, decided to cast off the shackles of prior
appropriation, disregarding traditional limitations on how much and
for what reasons water could be applied to ISF maintenance.
According to OWRD, almost any valid water right may be leased for
instream purposes in the state, if doing so does not cause injury to
existing users.59 Thus, instream water rights may be transferred on a
temporary basis to protect a diversity of needs including the protection
of fish and wildlife, scenic values, and water quality. ' In addition,
This allowance
OWRD may hold ISF lease rights for "public use."'
has opened the door to many leasing opportunities since inclusive in
the definition of public use are threatened recreational values."'
The provisions in Oregon law regarding salvaged water are similar
to those of Montana law. Whereas "[miost western states do not allow
users to keep or sell water that becomes surplus through conservation
efforts such as installing more efficient irrigation systems, lining
ditches, or repairing pipes," Oregon water users not only maintain a
right to such waters, but may, in fact, be rewarded financially for their
efforts.'6 In Oregon, salvaged, or "conserved water" is created when a
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3) (a), (b) (2001).
Id. § 537.348(2).
156. MONT. CODEANN. §§ 85-2-436(2)(b), 85-2-408(3) (a) (2001).
157. See discussion infra on Colo. Senate Bill 156 accompanying notes 337-347.
158. A DRY LEGACY 1, supra note 26, at 6 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)
(2001) (emphasis added)).
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.578(2) (2001); see also Oregon Water Resources
Department, Instream Leasing Program,at
[hereinafter
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/instreams.shtml
OWRD LeasingProgram].
160. OWRD Leasing Program,supra note 159.
161. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2001).
162. Id. § 537.332(5)(a).
163. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA S. SNYDER, POL. EcONOMY RESEARCH CENTER,
154.
155.

PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP

(1997),
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right holder reduces the amount of water traditionally diverted to
satisfy an existing beneficial use by "improving the technology or
method for diverting, transporting, applying or recovering the
water... .""' The right to the amount of water conserved maintains
"the same legal status as any other water right for which a certificate
has been issued.""" Thus, agency rules state that such rights may be
freely transferred, or leased for instream use, as if they were originally
perfected through diversionary means.'66 Once again, this allowance
represents a significant departure from historical prior appropriation
restrictions and "aims to correct the misguided incentives of the
beneficial use requirement by giving water right holders an incentive
to conserve water."57
Although Oregon law is quite favorable to private involvement in
the ISF conversion process, some ambiguity remains as to whether
private individuals may hold instream rights.6 8 An instream right is
defined as a "right held in trust by the Water Resources Department
for the benefit of the people ....
This language contradicts that
authorizing "any person" to lease existing rights for conversion to
instream use." Until 1998, the State maintained the position that the
former wording was controlling, requiring title to each instream right
obtained by a private entity in turn be transferred to OWRD."' After a
decade of adherence to this condition, some private groups began to
argue vociferously that ownership was essential to the success of their
efforts.
In response, OWRD began issuing "flow enhancement water
rights," which are essentially the same as ISF rights, but private
organizations may hold the right.' 71 Thus far, however, the state has
declined to issue such rights for temporary lease transfers, opting to
limit this declaration to rights acquired permanently by sale, grant, or
donation.'71
While some organizations may see possession as an indispensable
component of successful flow protection, the prudent conservationist
must realize that the importance of maintaining title to a right is
secondary to the ability to facilitate acquisitions.
The primary
organization in Oregon's emergent ISF water market, the Oregon
http://www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/priming-full.php?s=2.
164. OR. RFv. STAT. § 537.455(1), (2) (2001).
165, Id. § 537.500(1).
166. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(1).
However, the law only allows the user
employing conservation measures to keep 75 percent of the saved water for additional
use, sale, or lease. The remaining 25 percent must remain instream. GILL1LAN &
BROWN, supra note 19, at 162.
167. Schiller, supra note 47.
168. Telephone Interview with Fritz Paulus, Executive Director, Oregon Water Trust
(uly 10, 2003).
169. OR. Rv.SrAr. § 537.332(3) (2001).
170. Id. § 537.348(1).
171. LANDRY, supra note 146, at 33.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 33-34.
174. Id. at 45 n.49.
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Water Trust ("OVAIT"), has shown a remarkable ability to preserve
water in threatened areas without maintaining possessory rights. In
fact, more has been accomplished under the Oregon program-which
generally precludes private, organizational, or corporate ownership of
instream rights-than under the Montana legal framework, which
openly permits non-government possessory interests. What must also
be remembered are the numerous benefits conservation groups reap
from State oversight. While the majority of these will be discussed
below, it suffices to say here that state agencies are able to provide
continuity of stewardship, while administering the transaction process
with a greater degree of impartiality than organizations with vested
interests.
OWT's creation was directly attributable to the 1987 legislation
that recognized the validity of ISFs in the context of Oregon's prior
appropriation system.'75 Nonetheless, it would not be until six years
later, in the winter of 1992, that "a small group of individuals
representing agriculture, environmental, legal, and tribal interests got
together ...to discuss possible alternatives" to the existing utilization
of the law." 6 Shortly thereafter, OWT emerged as the state's primary
"broker for private parties interested in donating their rights to the
State for instream flow."17 7 Over the next decade, OWT-modeling its
conservation efforts after successful land trusts such as the Nature
Conservancy and the Trust for Public Land-broadened its strategic
approach to ISF protection by pursuing creative and mutually
beneficial lease transactions based on free market ideology.1" Today it
OWT
is said that "[mlore than any other private organization,
79
demonstrates the applicability of markets to water policy."'
As might be expected, OWT's efforts were not universally
accepted. In fact, "[t]he Trust began its activities in a polarized
Even in
atmosphere that had set farmers against environmentalists.".
the face of continuing success in improving the state's waterways,
legislative challenges invariably arose in an attempt to restrict the ease
with which consumptive water users could lawfully transfer rights to
those such as O"AT who would convert them to instream uses. For
example, in both 1995 and 1997, state lawmakers introduced
legislation that would have severely limited the transferability of out-ofNeuman & Chapman, supranote 149, at 167.
Schiller, supra note 47. Originally, OWT was comprised of:
[T]he president of a large land management company who was also a
member of the Oregon Cattleman's Association; the director of Oregon
Trout, Oregon's leading wild fish environmental group; the manager of one
of the state's largest irrigation districts; and an attorney who had been a longtime activist for in-stream flows .... The Trust founders recruited four more
Board members, two academics and two tribal representatives, and waded
into the water market.
Neuman & Chapman, supranote 149, at 135-36.
177. Sterne, supra note 40, at 214.
178. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 139.
179. Schiller, supra note 47.
180. Landry & Peck, supra note 56.
175.
176.
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stream water to instream rights. 81 Under the terms of the 1997 bill,
water rights originally "issued for agricultural purposes [would have
been transferable] only to other agricultural uses." ' Fortunately, the
state legislature failed to adopt the regressive measures, and OWT was
allowed to flourish.
Over its first summer, OWT entered into five lease agreements for
ISF rights."" Under the terms of its first negotiated lease, OWT agreed
to purchase hay the lessor would have otherwise grown on his riparian
land to feed cattle; 8 4 another lease was donated; and the Trust

provided monetary compensation at market value for the remaining
three.' 8s5 By 1998, OWT had completed thirty-one transactions and by
the end of 1999, its portfolio included fifty-one instream rights-the
majority of them established on a temporary basis.' These temporary
rights accounted for about 28.71 cfs of the total 32.28 cfs left instream
that year under OWT-facilitated agreements. 8 7 By the 2001 irrigation
season, OWT was involved in eighty-two projects, preserving 101.66 cfs
of natural flows-93.56 cfs of which were preserved under temporary
leases. 188

Other private organizations in Oregon have also played a part in
For instance, in 1994, the
the state's ISF restoration program.
Bonneville Power Administration ("BPA") and an agricultural user
entered into an instream flow lease. Under the lease, which included
an option to purchase the rights, BPA left 150 cfs in the Snake River
Nonetheless, leases involving
and 68.4 cfs in the Malheur River.'8
private parties other than OWT are rare. As a result, OWT is the most
prominent player in Oregon's ISF protection regime and is now widely
respected as "the oldest and most active private acquirer of instream
rights" in the West.' 90
b. Legal and Procedural Requirements
Keeping in mind recent debate over the issue, the general rule is
that only OWRD may hold leased rights to instream water for any
Notwithstanding the issuance of "instream
meaningful period.
enhancement rights," the State's position is that "any person who
leases, purchases, or receives.., a water right and converts it to
instream flow must transfer the right to [OWRD] to hold in trust for

181. Richard G. Hildreth, Water Law at the Crossroads,14J. ENVrL. L. & LrITG. 11 n.53
(1999).
182. H.R. 2628, 69th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
183. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 148.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 148.
186. Id at 149.
187. Id.
188. Oregon Water Trust, 2001 OWT Projects, at
http://www.owt.org/deals2001.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
189. Sterne, supra note 40, at 214.
190. Thompson, supra note 11, at 271.
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the people of Oregon."' 9' However, unlike the Colorado system,
private parties are granted substantial leeway in targeting reaches of
stream, facilitatin various transactions, and holding ISF rights, even if
only temporarily.'
The differences in the developmental histories of the Montana and
Oregon leasing laws create a sharp distinction between the two states'
statutory structures. Montana, over a six-year period, experienced an
evolution in its leasing flow program. The program originally called
for a state-only acquisition program but later created an allowance for
private-sector involvement in ISF acquisitions.'" Because Montana
initially prohibited non-agency involvement in stream protection
efforts, the legislature drafted the original legislation to allow
flexibility in the State's dealings with private right holders-thus, the
temporary leasing study. Were the State restricted to acquiring
permanent rights through donation or purchase, it would have lacked
the flexible nature of leasing strategies necessary to restore healthy
flows in threatened basins where users were unwilling to completely
relinquish their rights.
The Oregon experience was quite different. When the Oregon
legislature drafted its ISF enabling statute in 1987, it simultaneously
created the first avenues for both state- and privately-initiated ISF
transactions. As such, the state legislature perhaps did not feel
similarly compelled to draft specific language decreeing a State's right
to enter lease agreements. Instead, the mission of the State would
hinge more on the "establishment of new in-stream water rights."194
This somewhat subtle variation in the creation of the two states'
leasing laws has had a profound effect on the manner in which
government agencies and public interest groups have pursued
available rights. In Montana, MFWP, in a sense, competes for the same
rights sought by non-profit groups. Although guided by different laws,
they are nonetheless governed by virtually the same standard of nonharm.' 95 In Oregon, however, state agencies and public interest groups
each have specific areas of interest and, for the most part, operate
within two different legal frameworks. While the nature of the law
focuses state efforts on the establishment of new ISF rights,
conservation groups-most notably OWT-tend more to seek out and
develop ISF rights through the right transfer process, often on a
stringently
temporary basis.' 9" ...Moreover, State acquisitions are more
..
197
reviewed than transactions between two contracting private parties.

191. Sterne, supra note 40, at 213.
192. Thompson, supra note 11, at 270-71; see Sterne, supra note 40, at 213-14.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 103-123.
194. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 138 (emphasis added).
195. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2407(4), 85-2-408(3)(a) (2001) (private lease
transfers); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436(2) (g) (2001) (FWP Leasing Study).
196. See Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 138.
197. Telephone interview with Fritz Paulus, supra note 168.
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State Powers - OWRD issuance of 1SF water right certificates
Prior to the 1987 legislation that in effect "converted all existing
minimum flows into instream rights," OWRD could unilaterally
"investigate adoption of minimum perennial streamflows" for
The new legislation, however, precluded the
threatened areas. 9
agency from establishing a right on its own motion. '99 Instead, OWRD
may now consider requests to establish ISF rights only from three state
agencies: Fish and Wildlife, Environmental Quality, and Parks and
Recreation.2 0 0 That the statutory language expressly calls for flow
requests from agencies with a broad range of responsibilities is
indicative of the numerous ISF purposes that may qualify as beneficial
uses.
In Colorado, however, requests from secondary state agencies are
neither necessary nor expressly solicited. CWCB must considerrequests
from any persons or governmental agencies and request
recommendations from the Division of Wildlife and the Division of
Parks and Outdoor Recreation prior to its initiation of the ISF
appropriation process. 20 ' However, a 1987 amendment to the WRDA
made clear that "the authority of the Board to file for instream flow
rights, or rights to maintain natural lake levels, [is] exclusive. 20 2
Although outside agencies play a large part in Oregon's instream
appropriation scheme, new ISF rights are established through a
certification process ultimately overseen by OWRD. OWRD grants
certificates for new rights only after the applicant agency submits a
valid application including, but not limited to the following: (1) a
detailed description of the particular reach of river or stream to be
protected; (2) the public use to be served through establishment of
the right; and (3) the amount of water requested, the period of its use,
and the technical methods to be used to determine the requested
In addition to the mandatory requirements, the
amounts. 2 3
requesting agency is encouraged to include: "(a) [the] means and
location for measuring the instream water right; (b) [t]he strategy and
responsibility for monitoring flows for the instream right; and (c)
[a]ny provisions needed for managing the water right to protect the
,,214
public uses.
Upon receiving an application from one of the three certified
agencies, OWRD embarks on a lengthy bureaucratic certification
process. Prior to final certification, OWRD must perform (1) a
completeness review; (2) an initial review to determine whether the

198. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 139; Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
199. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
200. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 138 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. §
537.336(I)-(3) (2001).
201. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
202. JAMES N. CORBRIDGE,JR. & TERESA A. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATIER LAW 4041 (James N. CorbridgeJr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
203. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0020(4) (2003).
204. Id. § 690-077-0020(5)(a)-(c).
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requested water is available and whether granting the certificate would
run contrary to statutory law; and (3) an issuance of public notice to
potentially affected state and federal agencies, Indian tribes, and
persons on OWRD's weekly mailing list. ° At the completion of this
process, OWRD may either approve the new instream right as
requested, issue a certificate for a new right for a lesser quantity than
requested, or deny a certificate for a new ISF right upon a
determination that doing so would either benefit or run contrary to
the public interest. 0°
Privatelyfacilitatedagreements includingsplit-and dry-season leases
Individuals may acquire existing rights, or portions thereof, and
take responsibility for changing the use to instream purposes in an
administrative hearing, but then must turn the right over to OWRD to
be held in trust for the people of the state.07 All leases entered into
under the program are "short-term" leases because under no
2 08
If
circumstances may the lease terms exceed a period of five years..
the agreement specifies split-season use, the lease may be valid for only
one year.20 9 However, there are no limitations on renewals in Oregon
for either full- or split-season ISF leases. 2' Leasing to private parties is
thus an attractive prospect to many landowners, as it gives them the
chance to "test the market waters," and either negate their
commitment after a short period, or continue to operate under a
"temporary" agreement for as long as they wish.
Transferring water rights through private contract rather than
through governmental channels in many cases allows grantors to avoid
cumbersome bureaucratic processes. For example, in Oregon, the
issuance of a new certificate is not mandated when private parties draft
ISF lease agreements among themselves; rather the temporary right is
established by the lease agreement itself.2 ' OWRD may, however, at
the request of the lessor, issue a new certificate for the instream water
right indicating the priority date. 112 Nevertheless, parties who convert
all or a portion of a water right to instream use through a lease
the standard statutory requirements for
agreement must comply with
2 12
the transfer of a water right.
Applications for instream right transfers are submitted to the
Oregon Water Resources Commission ("OWRC"), a seven-member
board appointed by the governor to oversee the activities of OWRD." 4
205. Id. § 690-077-0027, -0029,-0031.
206. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.343(1)(a)-(c) (2001); OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-0770047(3) (a)-(c) (2003).
207. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 122.
208. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(1) (2003).
209. Id. § 690-077-0079(1).
210. Id. § 690-077-0077(14),-0079(1).
211. Id. § 690-077-0000(3).
212. OR.REv. STAT. § 537.348(1) (2001).
213. Id.
214. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0070 (2003); see also OREGON WATER REs. DEP'T, ABOUT
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First, OWRD reviews all lease applications to ensure the application
itself is in compliance with agency rules, and, "if possible, to develop
conditions to prevent enlargement of the original right or injury to
In order for a lessor to receive agency
other water right owners.
approval, "[i]nstream transfers must show that injury will not occur
and that a beneficial use will be made of the water during the lease
period. 2 16 As previously mentioned, the later qualification is relatively
easy to satisfy-OWRD rules ask: (1) that the lease agreement state
how the lease will serve a public use;1 7 and (2) that the application
specifically identify the public uses, which include pollution
of aquatic and wildlife habitat, or
abatement,• improvement
218
recreational values.
In most cases, applicants need only fill out a standard "Short-Term
Water Lease Agreement," 21 9 specifying standard information such as
the party names, amount of water to be leased, and the public value
sought to be protected or improved. If the right conversion is to occur
on a split-season basis, the contracting parties must file a simple
addendum in conjunction with the standard form, stating the periods
when the right will be applied to its historical use and when it will be
left instream.20 In addition, the application must convey the location
and type of device to be used to measure the flows, the frequency with
which such measurements will be taken, and 22the identity of the parties
1
responsible for recording the measurements.
Perhaps in an effort to reduce burdensome red tape, and to
establish more effective basin-wide conservation efforts, OWRD has
shrewdly devised a procedural framework for those situations where
multiple landowners are attracted to the idea of leasing rights on a
collective basis. Rather than having to process multiple change
applications from users within a single basin, Oregon law encourages
the pooling of multiple requests to enter lease agreements. Instead of
requiring each individual right holder to enter separate lease
agreements with interested conservation groups such as OWT,
irrigation districts may enter such agreements on the landowners'
behalves via the submission of a "pooled lease form 2 2 2 containing
THE OREGON WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, at

http://www.wrd.state.or.us/commission/about.html.
215. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-065(2) (2003).

216. OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON: AN INTRODUCTION TO
OREGON'S WATER LAWS AND WATER RIGHTS SYSTEM 33 (2002).
217. OR.ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(3)(d) (2003).
218. Id. § 690-077-0000(3).
219.

See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TERM INSTREAM LEASE

(Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/forms/StandardLeaseForm03.doc.

220.

See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR SPLIT SEASON INSTREAM LEASE 1

(Dec. 2003), available at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewar-dship/forms/SplitSeason.doc.
221. Id.
222.

See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TERM INSTREAM LEASE

POOLED LEASE FORM 1 (Dec. 2003), available at
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water right information from each participating landowner.22 3
Although an application submitted in this fashion must be
accompanied by individual forms completed by each right holder,24
the OWRC reviews and approves or denies the conversion request as it
would a lease agreement executed between a trust and a single right
holder.
Following the receipt of the change application, the OWRD
Director, under authority of the OWRC, must make a determination
whether "[t]he amount and timing of the proposed instream flow is
allowable within the limits and use, including return flows, of the
original water right; and [t]he proposed reach(es) is (are)
appropriate." 22

If OWRD determines the proposal may inflict injury

upon existing rights, or cause an enlargement of the original right, the
lease is not necessarily rejected. The agency retains the authority to
modify the agreement to prevent enlargement or injury.226 Following
approval, OWRD "may [also] revoke ...the temporary
transfer at any
"
time if [it] finds that the transfer is causing injury. ,2
Thus, while the Oregon system resembles that of Colorado in
vesting power with a single entity to maintain ISF rights, the similarities
do not carry much further. Notwithstanding that OWRD, much like
CWCB, is empowered with the sole authority to hold ISF rights in trust
for the people of the state, the Oregon system grants broad
permissibility as to who may originally acquire the right. This
distinction, perhaps more than any other, sets the Oregon approach to
preserving its natural river and stream flows apart from the Colorado
approach. Unlike Colorado, "Oregon actively enforces its rights,"
provides market incentives for acquiring instream rights, and provides
that ISF decrees
may automatically stop additional future
22
development.

http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/forms/RevisedPooledDistrictForm
.doc.
223. See OWRD Leasing Program,supra note 159.
224. See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TERM INSTREAM LEASE,
POOLED LANDOWNER FoRM 1 (Jan. 2004), availableat
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/forms/RevisedPooledLandownerF
orm.doc.
225. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0075(2)(a), (b) (2001).
226. Id. § 690-077-077(8).
227. Id. § 690-380-8000(6).
228. Melinda Kassen, Legal Protection for Instream Flows 2 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Denver Water Law Review).
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GROWING INTEREST AND COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES TO
PRIVATE ISF RIGHTS

Stakeholders across the West have advanced multiple justifications
for expanding the breadth of private-sector involvement in the ISF
preservation game. Arguably, a market approach creates flexibility in
the system, eliminates political and bureaucratic barriers to
meaningful conservation efforts, and allows public interest groups'
direct involvement with agricultural users, which in turn enables the
establishment of mutual trust between agricultural and environmental
interests. However, from an economist's point of view, the overriding
attractiveness of introducing market forces to a given endeavor is that
doing so promotes financial feasibility while maximizing benefits to
the contracting parties. In states that limit instream acquisitions and
transfers to agency action, fiscal constraints have tended to severely
limit the number of ISF conversions that governing agencies can
reasonably complete each year.22 g Those systems that allow private
money to filter into the acquisition scheme, however, have shown a
much greater ability to stave off harmful river and stream depletion. 2 °
In market systems, water trusts and other conservation groups are
often able to successfully fulfill their missions without resorting to
costly and harmful adversarial battles with competing interests.
Litigating suits under federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), or Clean Water Act ("CWA"), or under state regulation
necessitates quick and severe drains on organizational funds. Political
campaigning and lobbying for more stringent flow regulation are also
costly, not to mention time consuming. In many cases, efforts to
protect threatened waterways are time sensitive-the areas that
organizations are fighting to protect suffer while opportunities for
cooperation among the two sides wane. Lease transactions, on the
other hand, enable conservation groups to apply their resources
directly to mending the threat, thereby maximizing their spending
efficiency. Lease transactions also benefit water right owners in any
number of ways depending on the type of transaction owners feel is
right for them: "Water leases provide cash and flexibility, purchases
23
offer large cash payments, and donations can provide tax relief. 1
Those who view with skepticism the ability of emergent ISF water
markets to continue to grow need only look at the statistics: Overall
expenditures on instream rights have grown tremendously in recent
years. Whereas outlays among the northwestern states for ISF leases
and purchases were almost undetectable in 1990, they grew to $6
million in 1994, and to $9 million in 1996. 32 From 1990 to 1998, "an
estimated $36 million was spent on leases and purchases of water for
229. See generally Sterne, supra note 40, at 221-22.
230. Id. at 222.
231. Landry & Peck, supra note 56 (quoting Andrew Purkey, former director of the
Oregon Water Trust) (quotations omitted).
232. Landry, supra note 45, at 5.
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instream use" in the Pacific Northwest.' 13 The vast majority of this
money ($30.5 million) was applied to lease purchases.
Although
state and federal governments are still the dominant investors in the
establishment of ISF rights, "private acquisitions... are increasing in
size and number," and if focused on small tributaries, "may represent
the entire flow of the stream.,
In Montana, MFWP-held rights still account for the majority of the
total number of ISF flows held in the state.2 36 However, MFWP has not
negotiated a new lease since 2001.27 Moreover, most of the fifteen
lease rights it holds are for relatively small amounts of water ranging
from 1.0 cfs to 41.4 cfs annually, with the majority of them coming in
at the lower end of that range.
While MFWP has been relatively
hesitant to lease any new or larger rights, MTU now holds five ISF
leases that leave over 250 cfs instream during critical periods.2 9 Taken
together, three of these leases-all executed with the same offstream
user under a single agreement-represent "the largest lease of its kind,
not only in Montana, but also in the West., 24 MTU purchased the
split-season rights, collectively named the "Sun Ranch" leases after the
lessor's farm, in order to protect flows on three separate tributaries of
the Madison River.2 4' The three flows account for approximately 220
cfs of water previously diverted out of stream; this is approximately the
same amount of water left instream each year under all fifteen MFWAp
leases during times of minimum diversion. 4 The impressive growth in the number of private acquisitions is
attributable to an influx of funding to privately sponsored public
interest organizations, all of which were made possible by the
aforementioned developments in Montana and Oregon law. OWT
began in 1994 with an annual operational budget of approximately
$120,000.! 4 By 1998, the budget more than doubled to $264,000;
between 1994 and 1998, OWT's funding for acquisition of water rights
235

233. Id. at 3.
234. See id. at 6.
235. Id. at 8.
236. ZiemerMemorandum, supra note 72.
237. FWP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63, at app. a.
238. Id. It should be noted that some of the leases included in the "fifteen" involve
multiple users. In some cases, as many as six water users pooled their existing rights
into a single lease transaction with MFWP. Taking into account the pooled lease
agreements, approximately twenty different right holders currently convert their
offstream uses to instream flow, all on a seasonal basis.
239. Letter from David Collinge, Montana Trout Unlimited to Jason Wells 2-3 (July
30, 2003) (including Laura Zeimer's responses to questions posed by Mr. Wells) (on
file with the University of Denver Water Law Review).
240. News Release, Montana Trout Unlimited, Historic Water Lease Benefitting
[sic] Madison River Fishery Announced I (Sept. 5, 2001), at
http://www.outdoorrelease.com/newsreleases/news-detail.aslD=162&cat=13.
241. Id.
242. Id. Nine of the fifteen FWP leases call for differing flow amounts at different
times depending on time of year and seasonal conditions. See FWP PROGRESS REPORT,
supra note 63, at app. A.
243. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 140.
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totaled $284,000. 44 Additionally, the Trust acquired $370,000 worth of
donated water rights. 4 5 In 1993, OWT started out merely as an idea to
test a free-market environmental protection policy. By 1998, the Trust
had protected over 450 miles of threatened river throughout the
The appearance on the water market horizon of new
state.
organizations such as CWT and the Montana Water Trust, which
recently negotiated its first ISF lease right,2 47 evidences a burgeoning
interest in privately facilitated transactions.
As a final note on the economics of instream right transactions, a
glaring cost discrepancy exists between purchase acquisitions and lease
transactions. In 1998, the mean price for purchased ISF rights in the
Pacific Northwest was $151.38 per acre-foot; leased rights were valued
at a more affordable $30.40 per acre-foot.2 48 Comparing these figures,
it becomes immediately evident why the majority of conservation
efforts focus on the establishment of lease rights. Taking into account
the finite budgets of organizations operating in the market, leased
rights offer the best way to keep the most water instream during late
summers or dry years. In many cases, purchased rights provide no
conservation benefits beyond those a lease on the same watercourse
establishes. Yet purchased rights demand massive commitments of
financial resources, which may foreclose the possibility of other
acquisitions. While leases may fail to offer guarantees for perpetual
natural flow preservation, there is little doubt the public interest
groups' expenditures have, nonetheless, translated into noticeable
improvements to the natural conditions of depleted rivers and streams
throughout the Northwest.
V. POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF OFFSTREAM TO INSTREAM
LEASE TRANSFERS: WHAT BARRIERS EXIST?
To be sure, "voluntary market transfers of water rights are an
increasingly important means of shifting water from out-of-stream uses
to in-stream uses. ,249 Nevertheless, one should be careful not to hail
rivers
the free market as a universal panacea for Colorado's
25 depleted
and streams. Regulatory safeguards such as the ESA ' and the CWA,51
together with judicial declarations upholding such legal principles as

244. Schiller, supra note 47.
245. Id.
246. IUCN-THE WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, VISION FOR WATER AND
STRATEGY FOR CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE
RESOURCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25-26 (2000), available at
WORLD

MANAGEMENT

NATURE, A
OF WATER

http://www.iucn.org/webfiles/doc/WWRP/Publications/Vision/VisionWaterNature.
pdf.
247. The MWT lease memorializes an agreement whereby 300 acre-feet will be left
instream each year for the duration of the lease. MWT has also negotiated a purchase
agreement for 100 acre-feet. Ferguson Interview, supra note 128.
248. Landry, supra note 45, at 9.
249. Hildreth, supra note 181, at 11.
250. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
251. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
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and the validity of federal reserved rights,

23

play a vital role in the continuation of effective stewardship. Most
conservationists remain doubtful that absent these safeguards a free
market approach to ISF protection would manage, on its own, to
sustain natural streamflows to the same extent as under the present
regulatory and common law framework.5
Indeed, many see free market transfers merely as a valuable
complement to the broader existing methods of river and stream
protection. Some, meanwhile, believe the free market has no place
whatsoever in the allocation scheme of a public good such as water. In
either case, it market transfers have limitations, and, in fact, drawbacks
of which advocates of private instream leasing should be acutely aware.
The following list is not meant as an exhaustive summary of the
problems that arise with ISF leasing; it merely highlights some issues
that surface and, in some cases, offers solutions or clarifications:
1. Restricted reach and duration. The first fundamental limitation of
voluntary leasing programs is that they represent just one potential
tool for restoring and preserving ISFs. For rapid, far-reaching change,
voluntary acquisition programs fall short. As previously mentioned,
most lease agreements leave relatively small amounts of water
instream. Therefore, to restore natural historical flows to an entire
basin, one must look beyond leasing strategies for answers. Likewise,
lease agreements invariably fail to offer restoration in perpetuity due
to their temporary nature. If a landowner has a change of heart,
transfers title to the land to which the water is appurtenant, or if the
market no longer provides the best opportunity for profit, the lease
may expire without renewal.
Some environmental organizations may be leery of entering short
term ISF leases out of fear that the original right holders will use such
arrangements to "park" their water rights until a more profitable
option presents itself. The potential for water parking occurs when a
consumptive right holder anticipates that an appropriative right will
have significant market value as a different out-of-stream use in the
near future-municipal consumption for instance. A temporary
conveyance of that right to an instream use may allow a part5 to profit
The
from the right until its consumptive value nipens.
environmental objective of ISF leasing thus becomes confounded as
right holders maximize their financial gain under the guise of
ecological responsibility, with little or no intent for their right to serve
the goal of maintaining healthy streamflows in the long-term. In such
252. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
712 (Cal. 1983).
253. Primarily as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 577 (1908).

254. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 11, at 314 ("Public good markets are a simple
extension of regulatory markets," and thus should act as a means of fine tuning
regulation, rather than as a substitution for regulation.).
255. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, Colorado Trout Unlimited (Dec. 16,
2003).
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circumstances, the lessee water trust serves merely as a pack mule,
carrying the right until the consumptive worth of the right surpasses its
ISF lease value.
The lure of water parking is particularly powerful in Colorado,
where urban sprawl promises to continue its advance into presently
underdeveloped areas. Rapid commercial and residential growth
continues to thrive in areas where agricultural water users hold
numerous senior rights. The majority of all water rights changes in
Colorado in recent years have involved changes from agricultural use
to municipal and other non-agricultural uses.256 Agricultural users
eager to profit from their rights may be tempted by the prospect of
leasing these rights to water trusts while they survey other options.
Leasing in this manner gives potential opportunistic lessors a means of
warehousing a right on a temporary basis. Conservation groups, on
the other hand, are denied the promise of continued streamflow
preservation.
The contrapositive condition is that those organizations in the
business of acquiring rights are not tied to long-term stewardship
commitments on particular reaches of river or stream. Leasing
options allow organizations to "assess how effective water rights are in
If, for some reason, the
protecting stream flows" in a given area.
need to maintain or augment flows in a certain region decreases-for
instance if a stream becomes so depleted by subsequent diversions that
the lease, if renewed, would no longer serve its purpose-the lessor
can decide to let the agreement expire. The ability to discontinue
conversion agreements thus enables such organizations to dedicate
This
funds to more imminently threatened segments of river.
flexibility allows conservation groups to "yield significant ecological
benefits" with relatively small budgets. 58
2. Willing lessors and the consumptive use requirement. Obviously,
conservation groups cannot enter ISF leases with unwilling parties.
Leases, whether split- or dry-season, offer a viable conservation option
only when parties on both sides are eager to execute the transaction.
Those interested in free-market transfers have found that "[f]inding
willing sellers is one of the most challenging tasks in acquiring water
rights for instream flows. ' 2 59 Locating sellers willing to temporarily
convey water rights to financially strapped non-profits may be an
exceptionally daunting task in Colorado, where such groups must
compete with deep-pocketed cities and municipalities eager to find
new water sources. Unfortunately, "streams that suffer from low flow
almost invariably have cities on them." These cities will usually have

256. See TEREsA A. RICE & LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF LAW,
NATURAL RES. LAw CENTER, AGRIcULTURAL To URBAN WATER TRANSFERS IN COLORADO:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3-5 (1993).
257. LANDRY, supra note 146, at 21.
258. Id. at 18.
259. Id. at 15.
260. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, supra note 255.
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superior financial and political resources at their disposal to pursue
and acquire available senior water rights.
A scarcity of willing lessors could present a particularly problematic
stumbling block in Colorado, which holds steadfastly to consumptive
use requirements. Under statutory law, a right holder may change
only that portion of a water right for which a consumptive use can be
As Professor Corbridge notes, however, "[i]nadequate
established.
analysis of historical utilization or ambiguity in the law as to how that
historical use should be measured can lead to uncertainty and
confusion in the administration of the transfer system. '"2 When an
appropriator temporarily forgoes a diversionary right, electing instead
to leave water instream for a specified period, this non-consumptive
period may create more ambiguity as to the status of the right. "This
uncertainty [in turn] may dissuade creative transfer proposals and
thereby ultimately stand as an impediment to the efficient allocation of
water."263
Some potential lessors may feel uneasy about entering agreements
that would have them leave water instream due to the potential for
adverse users to claim the right abandoned. Abandonment of a right
precludes its transferability.26 In Colorado, abandonment is defined as
"the termination of a water right in whole or in part as a result of the
intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all
or part of the water available thereunder." ' Because ISF leasing in
almost all circumstances involves the conversion of a previously
consumptive and active use to a passive benefit, leases for extended
periods may give rise to the presumption of abandonment in the face
of a challenge. Conceivably, a water court hostile to the notion of an
instream flow as a continued use could find that the lease itself satisfies
the intent requirement. As such, a leased ISF right may be declared
abandoned and therefore available for appropriation or for satisfying
the rights of existing downstream users. With such concerns in mind,
an agricultural user interested in a split- or dry-season arrangement
may opt to enter a more traditional agreement with a consumptive
user after weighing the conservation alternative.
Lease transactions between willing parties serve a valuable purpose
by providing environmental benefits while avoiding the inevitable
imposition
tension that arises though the
•
• •
266of traditional "command and
Nonetheless, they are quite
control" mechanisms on private entities.
limited by their strictly voluntary nature. Some believe that since
instream uses tend to serve the public in general, it "make[s] sense

261. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(2) (a), -92-305(4) (2003); Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo. 2001).
262. James N. Corbridge, Jr., HistoricalWater Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A
Challengefor Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503, 504 (1998).
263.

Id.

264.

CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 202, at 245.

265. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(2) (2003).
266. See GILLIIAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 301.
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that public agencies should have control over instream protection
activities" in a state. 67 Absent legal safeguards that allow the State to
establish and maintain minimum stream flows in depleted and heavily
appropriated basins, it seems doubtful that enough willing and able
lessors exist to support a water marketing approach in isolation of
Others have warned that if water users become
other mechanisms.
too reliant on the market system, offstream users may cease converting
their rights to instream uses when there is no financial incentive to do
so. 26 ' Thus, ISF water marketing may be a viable option only in those
regions where there are both lessees with the ability to purchase ISF
rights and willing lessors.
3. Existing streamfiows. There are few areas in Colorado, if any,
where more water flows than has been claimed for consumptive uses;
This is not the
almost every stream in the state is overappropriatedF.'
case in some of the more humid areas of the West, such as the
northwest coast, where unappropriated water still flows through
sparsely populated areas. In such places, or wherever surplus water is
available, water leasing does not provide a mechanism for the
Because a lease agreement
preservation of these existing ISFs.
memorializes a temporary transfer of a right, they cannot establish new
rights.
Gillilan and Brown have suggested that private involvement in the
establishment of instream rights would be possible save a few
interceding factors. First, "water users, water agency officials, and the
general public" tend to lack a general understanding of instream
rights. 72 This lack of understanding, particularly where property rights
are at issue, has caused a widespread aversion to instream conversions,
even when existing water is available. Second, they outline the belief
that establishing new ISFs limits possibilities for future economic
development. 272 The potential for such a limitation, they concede, is
partially true. However, if more users were aware of such strategies as
split-season leasing, these users would realize that the establishment of
new ISFs "does not categorically exclude offstreamn uses."27 4 As with
existing rights, there is no reason a newly-established right could not
be shared by different users and serve different values during different
seasonal periods depending on needs and conditions.
One final concern with instream apprtpriationsis that if permitted,
"private environmental groups could seek to appropriate all remaining
unappropriated waters ...for speculative reasons, preserving the water

267. Id. at 120.
268. See id. at 302.
269. See generally Thompson, supra note 11, at 277-80.
270. See COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION SYSTEM,
at http://water.state.co.us/surfacewater/priorasp (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
271. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 99.
272. Id.at 302.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 303.
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along."
in the river only until a good marketing opportunity comes
Agricultural and other users thus fear that speculators, under the guise
of environmental protection, will buy up the entirety of a surplus flow,
forcing out current water users through high prices. However, while
speculation has been common in domestic and municipal water
purchases, little evidence exists thus far of widespread speculation in
the instream sector.
4. Standards of oversight. Some have warned that states run the risk
of imposing different standards or quality of stewardship by opening
water markets to the public. 77 Public entities generally have an
established protocol for overseeing the maintenance and enforcement
of acquired rights. Letting many players in the ISF acquisition game,
the argument progresses, can destroy continuity of oversight. A host
of organizations could potentially employ disparate standards of
management, monitor their rights with varying frequency and
accuracy, and participate in ISF programs for different reasons. From
the policy and legal perspectives, agency oversight is preferable to a
review of complaints under differing enforcement standards. Courts
would likely prefer the imposition of a single standard applied to
disputes arising under a lease agreement.
On the other hand, restricting ISF acquisitions to public entities
creates inconsistency of care. According to Sterne, the bureaucratic
process inherent in public acquisitions "prevents instream rights from
being fully integrated into the prior appropriation system," and
thereby relegates minimum streamflows to a status of "second-class"
water rights: 7 Without the status as a full private property right,
courts and public agencies are less likely to vehemently uphold the
terms of an instream transfer. Moreover, "[i]nadequate funding may
be the biggest impediment to vigorous enforcement of public instream
27 9
When a private organization invests significant time, money,
floWS."
and ideological commitment to acquire a right, that organization is
more apt to avidly enforce the right than a public agency with limited
resources.
5. Inordinate expenditures. In most cases, water transfers entail
"substantial transaction costs." 280
These may include "gathering
information, overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, and meeting legal
A 1990 study found that transaction costs in
requirements. 2 1 '
Colorado ranged from thirty-seven cents ($0.37) to $1702.00 per acrefoot of water transferred. 282 Agricultural users thus often cite the
275. Thompson, supra note 11, at 289.
276. See LANDRY, supra note 146, at 14.
277. Telephone Interview with Anne Janicki, Colorado Water Conservation Board
(July 17, 2003).
278. Sterne, supra note 40, at 219.
279. Id. at 217.
280.

GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 101.

281.

Id.

282. LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE WATER TRANSFER
PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENI OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMAND 26 (1990).

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volume 7

financial burdens associated with lease transactions as a deterrent to
selling unused or unwanted water. While lease transactions often
necessitate the same up-front expenditures in terms of measuring
requirements and administrative or adjudicative costs, the return on
investment is smaller than a permanent conveyance provides.
While all lease transactions require significant expenditures, the
"transactions costs for instream flow acquisition are likely to be higher
Thus, those
than for water rights purchased for off-stream uses."'
with marketable offstream water rights might find it more appealing to
sell their rights to those who would apply the right to other offstream
uses rather than incurring the additional costs of leasing rights for
instream uses. Moreover, potential lessors "often face opposition by
neighboring water users who fear the flexibility of their own rights will
Thus, high costs are incurred in overcoming
be constrained.
objections to the proposed new instream use of the water rights." 4
With the aggressive presence of municipal water seekers on Colorado's
Front Range, acquisition costs for potential lessees are driven upwards
beyond those that water trusts would expect to pay in more rural areas
of states like Montana and Oregon. 85
The fiscal concerns with transferring rights from offstream use to
instream uses are indeed genuine. Nevertheless, these concerns are
often premised on the relatively short history of dealings with public,
rather than private, entities. Often, bureaucratic stepping-stones and
multi-departmental review translate into high transaction costs, which
the lessor, lessee, or both must absorb.
In what is a relatively new approach to flow protection, these costs
will come down as the acquisition system becomes streamlined and
familiar. As private organizations gain more experience in the market
process, transaction costs will tend to decrease as the experience level
of an organization with leasing increasesws Moreover, in states that
have allowed private sector involvement in public leasing, increased
cooperation among public and private entities has also reduced
costs. 217 Finally, private organizations tend to have more financial
resources than public agencies to cover such costs.288 In a free market
system, potential parties to a lease contract can always choose not to
execute the lease. If they choose to do so, they incur the costs
themselves; in most existing systems, the costs associated with
establishing instream rights must be absorbed by the public, sectors of
which may not support the acquisition program and are thus hesitant
to pick up the tab.

283. Bonnie G. Colby, Benefits, Costs and Water Acquisition Strategies: Economic
Considerationsin Instream Flow Protection, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE

6-2, 6-21 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell &Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).

284. Id.
285. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, supra note 255.
286. See LANDRY, supranote 146, at 24.

287. Id.
288. See generally Sterne, supra note 40, at 221-22.

WEST,

at

Issue 2

LEASING WATER RIGHTS FOR INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION

353

6. Bureaucraticred tape and the Colorado Water Court distinction. When
state agencies acquire the responsibility to request and hold ISF rights,
they must establish guidelines and agency rules that balance the need
to protect downstream, non-party users against the need to process
right changes in a timely fashion. The process called for by such
guidelines may have substantial impacts on policy implementation.
For instance, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ'), in response to the state's adoption of an ISF program,
established a set of rules that would employ a rigorous methodology of
flow rate determination.'gq However, in the four years following the
enactment of the statute, the DEQ had failed to file for a single ISF
right. 90 The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife's ("DFW") selfimposed requirements29' are less strenuous; DFW filed 900 applications
for instream right certificates during the same period.9 2
As the Oregon DEQ-DFW distinction indicates, the bureaucratic
process can vary significantly among agencies even within the same
state. However, in states such as Oregon that allow both public and
private establishment of instream rights, the general rule is that "an
agency that wishes to set a minimum flow or acquire an instream right
must develop more data and endure a much longer and more timeconsuming hearings process than a private party seeking a new
consumptive appropriation or transfer. ' 29' As noted above, this rule
may apply to new acquisitions and transactions involving transfers from
one offstream use to another and may also apply to agreements that
convert offstream uses to instream rights. Again, in Oregon, agencies
must comport with certain filing and application requirements that do
not apply to private actors.294
Although the bureaucratic process for privately obtained or
facilitated rights is generally less arduous than that for agency-funded
rights, transfers negotiated among private parties may require a time
consuming, bureaucratic effort. In Montana, for example, the private
right transfer process is more rigid than the process required under
Oregon law. The Montana Water Trust advises potential lessors that
completion of a change of use process could take anywhere from six
months to a year.2 6 Unlike state water agencies, private organizations
are not 197susceptible to political pressures in the right establishment
This reality negates the need to balance the importance of
process.
establishing an ISF right against other competing public interests.29 8
289. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
290. d.
291. See OR. ADMIN. R. 690-400-0015 (2004).
292. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
293. Sterne, supra note 40, at 218.
294. SeeOR. REV. STAT. § 537.338 (2001).
295. FergusonInterview, supra note 128.
296. INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 44.
297. Cf Sterne, supra note 40, at 218 (describing that state water agencies are
susceptible to political pressures).
298. Id. (explaining that all instream flow statutes require public instreamn rights be
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Moreover, as with the burden of high transaction costs, the lengthy
bureaucratic process associated with ISF conversions is due, at least in
part, to the relative novelty of the ISF leasing approach."" As the
practice becomes more commonplace, agencies should be able to
process requests from private organizations in a more streamlined and
timely fashion.
While Montana and Oregon have clearly defined protocols for the
private establishment of instream leases, the means for doing so in
"Colorado law provides limited
Colorado remains opaque.
opportunities for temporary water transfers," of any type, much less
temporary transfers to ISFs. 00 Because private ISF leasing is generally
untested in Colorado and the law is void of legal provisions specifically
addressing the issue, if allowed by law, leasing mechanisms would
presumably need to operate within the existent water transfer
framework. Colorado's water law system is unique in that the water
judges of the state's seven water districts-rather than administrative
agencies as is the case in virtually all other western states-grant water
right transfers and changes in use through an adjudicative process.301
In Oregon the OWRD and in Montana the DNRC-agencies with
relatively conservationist mandates- ultimately approve offstream to
instream conversions.
In Colorado, however, CWCB must file
through the state attorney general
in the water court in order to
30 3
establish an adjudicated ISF right.
The water court distinction could have profound ramifications on
the operation of a leasing system. If the State were to allow private
entities to facilitate and fund temporary ISF conversions, it would
likely do so on the condition that CWCB be involved in the leasing
process. Lawmakers would likely demand significant CWCB oversight
of the transactional process and would ensure the agency holds leased
water rights in trust for the people of the state. Under the current
legal framework, each transfer request would require review through
the adjudicative process, with CWCB sitting as the petitioning party.
Such adjudication of the right could lead to lengthy, adversarial
contests straining both agency and private party resources. Even when
there is little or no resistance to an adjudicative
change, water court
104
determinations can take years to complete.
This process, in itself,
would produce a disincentive to ISF leasing and impose damaging
time-consuming requirements on potential lessors and lessees.
Considering the likelihood of lengthy and costly adjudicative
in the public interest).
299. See Colby, supra note 283, at 6-21.
300. CORBRIDGE & RiCE, supra note 202, at 275.
301. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN ANUTSHELL 153 (3d ed. 1997).

302. OR. ADMIN, R. 690-077-0075 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2A408 (1) (2003).
303. Steven 0. Sims, Colorado's Instream Flow Program: Integrating Instream Flow
Protection into a PriorAppropriationSystem, in INSTREAM FLow PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at
12-7 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
304. E.g., Michael F. Browning, Substitute Supply Plans: Recent Water Law Developments,
31 COLO. LAw 67, 67 (Aug. 2002).
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approval of ISF leases, instream advocates should seek excuse nonpermanent right transfers from the adjudicative process-at least for
an interim period while the transfer is under water court
consideration. In 2002, the Colorado General Assembly granted such
an exemption for Substitute Supply Plan ("SSP") requests.8 , SSPs are
plans for augmentation through which persons seeking to make a new
use of water agree to replace depletions resulting from the new use
with an alternate water supply equal in "amount, location, time and
quality" to the new use.0 6 In other words, SSPs allow out-of-priority
diversions by providing the stream with a substitute water supply.
House Bill 02-1414 granted the State Engineer the authority to
authorize SSPs while a change of use approval is pending in the water
court system, and even under certain circumstances when there is no
parallel water court change application pending.3°7
SSPs requests differ from requests for ISF lease authorization in
that they involve diversionary rather than instream water uses.308
Nevertheless, amendments to the new legislation could easily make a
The
similar administrative allowance for ISF lease agreements.
statutory construction created by House Bill 1414 already provides a
"mechanism to allow new uses of water to occur while an applicant
Thus, through its
seeks to obtain formal Water Court approval."'
enactment of House Bill 1414, the Colorado General Assembly has
demonstrated a willingness to provide water users with a less formal
administrative avenue when a protracted adjudicative process
threatens to defeat a use change without a sound justification.
"Colorado's change of water procedures could be modified to facilitate
temporary water transfers by streamlining the approval process.,,1
This streamlining would not necessarily compromise the no-harm
principle. The plain language of House Bill 1414 prevents the State
Engineer from approving any plan that would inflict injury on other
decreed water rights within a basin. 11 Therefore, a safety net exists to
preclude approval of any ill-conceived transactions.
7. Dismantling traditional tenets of law and tradition. Many in the
water law community have argued that any type of statutory adoption
that usurps historic water users' control over watercourses would lead
to a "slippery slope" and enable further intrusion on long-established
possessive rights.32 The concern is that when the private right to leave
water instream gains legal recognition, the holder of the right may
305. H.R. 02-1414, 63d Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-92-308 (2003)).
306. Browning, supra note 304, at 67.
307. H.R. 02-1414 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(4) (a), (5) (a) (2003)).
308. See Browning, supra note 304, at 67.
309. Id.
310. CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 202, at 276.
311. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(4) (a) (IV), (5) (a) (IV) (2003).
312. Sherry A. Caloia et al., The Water Rights Determnination and Administration Act of
1969: A Western Slope Perspective on the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 39, 53
(1999).
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gain not only a very senior appropriation date for the quantity of water
leased, but also a vested right to have the water left instream beyond
the period of the lease. Thus, the fear is that legislation embracing
and encouraging private leasing agreements marks a dangerous
departure from legal norms. The mere recognition of such rights
poses a problem for some: "The legislative adoption of an instream
acquisition program endorses the importance of instream flows and
undercuts the traditional preference in western water law for
consumptive uses."'" Instream acquisition programs, by this logic,
"undermine
policy arguments
against involuntary
instream
reallocations.'"3
While some fear that allowing private organizations to acquire
rights through lease purchases serves as a premonition for heightened
involuntary intrusion on property rights, others believe severing
appropriative water rights from property is alone condemnable. Those
in the latter camp object to the expansion of instream protection
programs for the simple reason that it marks a break with longstanding tradition. "Many individuals, therefore, do not look kindly
on the idea of separating the water from the land .... [T] hey view a
complete separation of the two as a direct threat to their way of life." 15
The arguments against water leasing come from more than just
agricultural or municipal users. In fact, many environmentalists
believe such strategies signal a regression in sound environmental
policy.'1 6 First, if the programs are strictly government-run, as they
usually are, "legislative appropriations are unlikely to fully reflect
public support for instream acquisitions."3 7 Although allowing the
influx of private funding to acquisition schemes would resolve this
issue, some in the conservation field nonetheless believe "by paying
some water users for instream flows, the government may undercut the
argument for direct regulation. 318
The alternate argument rests on the presumption government will
step in to maintain and restore ISFs if market activity does not protect
them. If concerned parties cannot agree upon devices such as ISF
leasing statutes, farmers and ranchers may lose their rights without
compensation. This scenario is not merely conjectural; numerous
judicial decisions have affirmed that existing rights to water are not
always absolute and may be subject to loss with little or no
compensation under either the public trust doctrine or federal law.
8. Expansion of historic use. Some resistance to broader ISF leasing
laws emanates from a concern lessees will gain temporary title to

313. Thompson, supra note 11, at 274.
314. Id.
315. Schiller, supra note 47.
316. Thompson, supra note 11, at 276.
317. Id.
318. Id.at 277.
319. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
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greater amounts of water than historically applied to consumptive uses.
Those with such concerns seek assurances leases will not expand
historic use.32° Shortly after Oregon adopted its ISF program in 1987,
OWRD began receiving complaints "from agricultural, municipal, and
rural domestic interests., 32' The complaints included allegations that
applications for instream rights under the program "requested flow
levels greatly exceeding what is naturally possible," and that such
requests sought flows in excess 2of those that historically remained in
2
the streams after appropriation.
Statutory language guarantees, at least on paper, that lessors
cannot temporarily transfer more water than historically diverted
through offstream use practices.323 Given the difficulty of measuring
historical and current use, however, there have undoubtedly been
circumstances in which more water remained instream under lease
agreements than has historically been applied to out-of-stream uses.
The response to such concerns must involve the establishment of strict
measuring requirements. Although monitoring requirements may
impose a burdensome cost, paying for such costs is preferable to
having a lease right invalidated because it causes an expansion of
historical use.
9. Colorado'sheightenedstate of water administration. As demonstrated
earlier, a region's hydrological backdrop profoundly affects that
region's approach to water management. In states such as Oregon
and Montana with less heavily appropriated rivers and streams, more
laxity exists concerning changes in use and user. In Colorado, by
contrast, tremendous growth, delivery obligations under interstate
compacts, and severely over-appropriated rivers and streams have
fostered an environment with no tolerance for slack in the
administration of the state's water resources. The fact that Colorado's
State Engineer administers water rights with unmatched rigidity is a
vital point to consider when contemplating an ISF leasing allowance.
IO.Delayed return flows and - potential for harm. One of the most
hardened of all principles embodied by the prior appropriation
doctrine is the "no harm rule."2 4 The most pressing issue associated
with ISF lease transfers-and that which has caused the most resistance
to the adoption of leasing statutes in general-is the potential for
harm to non-party downstream users:

320. Interview with Michael Browning, President, Colorado Water Trust (July 18,
2003).
321. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
322. Id. at 18-6.
323. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436(2)(e) (2003) (clarifying that "[t]he
maximum quantity of water that may be leased is the amount historically diverted by
the lessor"); see also OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(3) (c) (2001) (demanding that all
lease agreements include conditions which would "avoid enlargement of the original
right").
324. Farmer's Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 63132 (Colo. 1954).
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Downstream water users, for example, fear that reallocations will
negatively affect the timing of flows that are crucial to their
operations. In the dry season, farmers often depend on the return
flow from earlier upstream irrigation; if an upstream irrigator
transfers his water to instream flow, the delaed return flow upon
which the downstream users rely will disappear.
Indeed, some allude to this potential for harm as a reason to
expand state programs rather than to establish a truly free water
market. There are benefits to delayed return flows upon which many
offstream users have historically depended. When a conflict arises as
to whether a downstream user or the natural condition of a river or
stream will suffer harm, the downstream user typically wins the battle.
Thus, politically accountable state agencies, such as CWCB, must
consider not only the benefits lease transactions could afford
contracting users,3 26but also the potential detriment that downstream
users might incur.
States that have chosen to adopt aggressive ISF conversion
mechanisms have not done so oblivious to this risk, however. As
discussed in the preceding section, state legislatures are heedful of the
need to incorporate vigorous initial review processes, standards of
notice, opportunities for airing grievances, and, if necessary, the denial
of ISF conversions-if it becomes evident at any time throughout the
process that a non-party water user may suffer harm to his or her
existing right. The adoption of such vigilant laws, however, does
necessitate a trade-off. States such as Montana, which boasts an
overwhelmingly stringent review process, tend to experience less ISF
marketing activity than states such as Oregon where the conversion
311
process is more permissive.
Considering the rigid standards CWCB already employs in its
establishment and acquisition of instream flow rights,3 21 it would seem
doubtful that more lax criteria would apply to privately funded
institutions, should they participate directly in the acquisition
process.3 2
Historically in Colorado, "[a] water right cannot be
changed in... type of use, place of use, or otherwise if the change will

325. Thompson, supra note 11, at 274.
326. Telephone Interview with AnneJanicki, supra note 277.
327. Ferguson Interview, supra note 128.
328. SeeColo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102 (3)-(4) (2003).
329. Scholars of instream acquisition programs have specifically remarked on the
relative strictness of Colorado's administrative review process when CWCB seeks to
establish an instream right versus the review called for when a private party seeks to
establish an offstream right:
For example, Colorado's Division of Wildlife must submit applications to the
staff of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, which then makes a
recommendation to the Board. If approved by the Board, the application is
submitted to the state attorney general's office, which then takes the
application before one of the state's water courts. Offstream water rights
applicants can go directly before a water court.
GILLILAN & BROwN, supra note 19, at 135.
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result in material injury to other water rights."30 If temporary, private
transfers were legally permissible, one would assume they would
require lessors and lessees alike to maintain strict adherence to this
principle throughout the duration of a transfer. As noted below, the
limited legislation that has moved Colorado toward greater
permissibility tends to incorporate strong language meant to protect
the interests of all potentially affected water users.
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN COLORADO LAW: STEPS TOWARD
FREE-MARKET EXCHANGES
The statutory language authorizing CWCB to lawfully acquire
"such waters of natural streams and lakes as the board determines may
be required for minimum stream flows"3 ' represented a significant
departure from the traditional diversion requirement whereby water
3 3
must be removed from the watercourse in order to perfect a right.
As with most laws, however, its limits would ultimately be tested and its
scope redefined.
In 1986, the City of Fort Collins sought to obtain an instream right
on the Cache La Poudre River to return water to its historic channel
and support a boat chute and a fish ladder for recreational purposes.33
In a challenge to the City's proposed "instream diversion," the
Colorado Supreme Court held that under the statute, "It]he exclusive
authority vested in the CWCB to appropriate minimum stream flows
[did] not detract from the right to divert and to put to beneficial use
unappropriated water by removal or control.3 4 Because Fort Collins
controlled the water within its natural course for a beneficial use using
a structural device (i.e. a nature dam), the court held the instream use
was a valid appropriation.333 In so holding, "the court took pains to
point out that the appropriation by the City of Fort Collins did not
constitute an3 'instream flow right,'" the type that only CWCB could
appropriate .336
In May 2002,3' nearly ten years after the Cache la Poudre case,
Colorado Governor Bill Owens signed Senate Bill 02-156 ("Senate Bill

330. Michael Browning & Steve Bushong, Ditch Lining: The Water Right Issue, 21
COLO. LAW. 1155, 1155 (1992).
331. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
332. E.g. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570, 572 (Colo. 1979).
333. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992). For an
extended discussion on the case and its impact on the development of Colorado's
instream flow laws, see Christopher H. Meyer, Instream Flows: IntegratingNew Uses and
New Players Into the Prior Appropriation System, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE
WEST, at 2-8 to 2-9 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
334. 830 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added).
335. Id.
336. GILLItAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 118.
337. J. CRAIG GREEN, INDEPENDENCE INST., USE IT OR LOSE IT: COLORADO'S OLDEST
AND BEST RECYCLING PROGRAM, ISSUE PAPER NUMBER 3-2002, at 8 n.14 (2002).
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156").'s" The bill, as originally introduced, contained language that
ISF rights. 3 )
would have allowed for the private acquisition of
However, the governor opposed such a radical alteration of the
existing scheme; proponents of an expanded Rrogram were forced to
settle on the amendment as it presently stands.
Nevertheless, the legislation effected the most reaching alterations
to Colorado's ISF protection program in some time and may have
significant implications for its future operation. Senate Bill 156 made
essentially two changes to the WRDA. First, where the former statutory
language allowed CWCB acquisitions only "by grant, purchase,
bequest, devise, lease, exchange, or other contractual agreement," the
enactment specifically added the acquisition of 1SF rights by
This inclusion, however, was more or less a formality.
donation.!'
Since the passage of the original 1973 legislation, CWCB has always
operated under the assumption that it could secure ISF rights by
donation. 42 The second provision, however, fundamentally altered the
program's guiding language-where the statute formerly allowed the
CWCB to acquire "interests in water as [it] determine[d] may be
required for minimum stream flows," CWCB may now appropriate
"water in such amount as [it] determines is appropriate for stream
flows." '" While the original language effectively put a cap on the
amount of water CWCB could convert under the ISF protection
program-namely that necessary to preserve streamflows to support
aquatic life-the new language permits appropriations beyond those
necessary to merely sustain the rivers; the statute now allows for the
acquisition of rights that will improve currently degraded environments.
Supporters of Senate Bill 156 touted the legislation as "a powerful
new tool for instream protection" that could facilitate a significant
However, if the political
improvement to Colorado's rivers.
environment plays its typical part in the policy implementation stage,
this provision of SB156 could conceivably go by the wayside:
"[o]pponents worry the bill would prevent agricultural and
development interests from completely draining rivers and streams in
times of need. '' " Moreover, the language "may acquire34 suggests
338. S. 02-156, 63d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003)).
339. See CTU Supports Bill to Give ColoradoansNew Tool to Protect Free-FlowingStreams,
CURRFNTS FEBRUARY 2002, (COLORADO TROUT UNLIMIrED, BOULDER, CO), at
http://www.cotrout.org/CenturyClub/currents/currents2.2002.htm (Feb. 2002) (last
visited Apr. 13, 2004).
340. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, Colorado Trout Unlimited (Oct. 5,
2002).
341. S. 02-156 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
342. Telephone Interview with AnneJanicki, supra note 277.
343. S. 02-156 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003)) (emphasis
added).
344. Media Advisory, Trout Unlimited, Trout Unlimited Applauds Enactment of SB 156
(May 21, 2002), availableat
http://www.cotrout.org/SB%20156%20becomes%201aw.htm.
345. Theo Stein, Bill Protects 'InstreamFlows,'DENVER POST, Apr. 26, 2002, at 14A.
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that CWCB retains broad discretion in deciding when, where, and if to
apply the new standards.
In view of CWCB's friendly disposition toward consumptive users,
it seems more likely that CWCB will employ the provisions of Senate
Bill 156 sparingly rather than liberally. The extent and incidence with
which CWCB applies these new provisions may depend on continuing
pressure from the bill's original supporters. "SB 156 enjoyed support
from a diverse range of interests including Trout Unlimited, the
Colorado Water Congress, the Colorado Cattlemen's Association,
Denver Water, the Northwest Colorado Council of Governments, the
Colorado River Water Conservation District, Environmental Defense,
Audubon, and Clean Water Action ....,,317
While public interest groups statewide were scrambling to find
ways to effectively implement the conservation components of Senate
Bill 156, the Colorado legislature took yet another significant step
toward flexibility in 2003 when it adopted House Bill 03-1320 ("House
Bill 1320") .4 Signed by Governor Bill Owens in June 2003, House Bill
1320 was part of a larger "drought package," which was the direct
result of the crippling drought conditions Colorado experienced in
2002-2003, and included three other bills aimed at mitigating the
Whereas CWCB could
effects of future drought conditions.
previously acquire only permanent rights, House Bill 1320 allows water
users to loan water to CWCB for instream purposes, so long as the
water left instream flows through a basin or county in which the
350
governor has declared a drought emergency.
Following a preliminary review by CWCB in order to determine
whether the loan would interfere with other decreed water rights,351
the right holder interested in conveying the temporary loan must file a
proper request together with a $100 filing fee. 35 The request for State
approval must include:
(A) Evidence of the proponent's legal right to use the loaned water
right;
(B) A statement of the duration of the proposed loan;
(C) A description of the original points of diversion, the return flow
pattern, the stream reach, and the time, place, and types of use of the
loaned water right;
(D) A description of the new proposed points of diversion, the
return flow pattern, the stream reach, and the time, place, and types
346. S. 02-156.
347. Media Advisory, Trout Unlimited, supra note 344, available at
http://www.cotrout.org/SB%20156%20becomes%201aw.htm.
348. H.R. 03-1320, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (a) (2003)).
349. News Release, Office of Colorado Governor Bill Owens, Governor Signs SB 236
- Initiative to "Save Colorado's Water" (June 5, 2003), available at
http://www.state.co.us/owenspress/06-05-03b.htm (last modified June 06, 2003).
350. H.R. 03-1320.
351. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (a) (1) (2003).
352. Id. § 37-83-105(2)(b)(I).
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of use of the loaned water right; and
(E) A reasonable estimate of the historic consumptive use of the
loaned water right. s
The Division Engineer ("Engineer") must then review the
request.34 In deciding whether to approve a voluntary loan, the State
Engineer's central task is to determine whether granting the5
rights.1 1
temporary instream flow would injure others' existing water
In so doing, the Engineer must ensure the proponent has provided
proper notice to potentially affected usersand that the proposed use
356
of the water is for instream flow purposes.
Following the public notice period, concerned water users have
fifteen days to submit comments to the Division Engineer. 5 7 The
comments may claim potential injury, or recommend terms the
petitioner(s) believes are necessary in order to avoid such injury.3 58 In
response to such comments, the Engineer may either hold a hearing
to address the issues raised or, without conducting a hearing, impose
such terms and conditions as are necessary to ensure the no-harm
standard is met.3 9 The statute thus calls for a redundant review
process under which both CWCB and the Engineer's office must
review loan proposals in order to verify that the temporary transfer will
not harm non-party users. Those proposing the use change also enjoy
the protection of the courts; if the Engineer rejects a loan proposal,
the proponent may appeal the decision to ra water judge in the
appropriate water division within fifteen days.
It remains unclear whether Colorado will follow in the footsteps of
other states by allowing loan transfers only when low flow levels
threaten fisheries. Alternatively, courts will interpret the statutory
language to allow temporary transfers for the benefit of a broader
range of interests including recreational use. Since waters loaned to
CWCB under the statute are valid instream rights for the duration of
the loan,6' the guiding principles of Senate Bill 156 should apply. This
being the case, CWCB could lease waters in order to "improve the
natural environment to a reasonable degree." 6 However, House Bill
1320 contains language that significantly constrains the applicability of
loan transfers. First, no loan may exceed a period of one hundred
twenty days.
In most cases, loan transfers would fail to provide an
adequate mechanism to effect lasting ecological benefits. Second,
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considering drought conditions must be present before a water user
may permissibly loan a consumptive use right to the State, 4 any waters
acquired would fail to augment streamflows beyond minimum flow
rates. Nevertheless, the terms of House Bill 1320 offers a viable
preventative measure insofar as private loans during drought may head
off total depletion and ecological devastation during times of extreme
need. Furthermore, if the water loaning experiment meets with
success, non-profits will have more cause to argue for the
establishment of a leasing program.
OWRD has already implemented a plan not unlike that
contemplated under House Bill 1320, except Oregon offers
compensation for the drought-time transfer.
Agency rules permit
"any person holding a water use subject to transfer [to] enter into a
temporary drought instream lease agreement to convert a water right
or a portion of a water right to an instream water right. 36 The OWRD
director will approve such leases provided: "(a) [t]he temporary
instream lease shall not result in injury to an existing right; and (b)
[tiotal water use for the proposed instream lease [does] not exceed
the amount in the leased right."'67 Such leases cannot last for periods
beyond one year.68 Moreover, if the governor declares an end to the
drought before the lease period expires, the lease agreement
automatically terminates. 9
Although Colorado law has opened the door to permanent, and
now temporary, right transfers to instream use in the last two years, it
has nonetheless stopped short of creating market incentives for
temporary conversions. Although CWCB may enter lease agreements,
the financial lure private involvement otherwise provides is still nonexistent within the Colorado legal framework. Agencies such as CWCB
must operate on limited budgets, and are subject to political
constraints. Thus, while CWCB is presently party to five different lease
agreements, 70 other opportunities that arise could go by the wayside
due to fiscal restraints.
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VII. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE PARTY INVOLVEMENT?
Although virtually every state in the West has adopted the prior
appropriation doctrine, each has done so differently by adopting
unique rules for water management. In no area of water law is this
more true than in the promulgation of ISF protection statutes, where
"[e]ach state has had to work within the context of its own geography,
climate, and legal, political, and social institutions."371 Because the
notion of providing legal protection to non-consumptive uses is a
recent development and generally runs counter to the basic principles
of prior appropriation, the approaches of the various states differ
widely.37 2 One must take special note of a state's legal particularities in
order to determine whether implementation of the legal principles
Any analysis must begin with an
adopted in another state is feasible.
understanding of the legal domain within which the adopted laws
case, the ISF program that has grown out
would apply-in Colorado's
4
of the 1969 WRDA. 5
While numerous state programs exist with a greater tolerance
toward private sector involvement in ISF acquisitions, "[i] ntegration of
instream flow rights as 'appropriations' with priorities ... has not been
widely accepted outside of Colorado as yet." 5 For over thirty years,
CWCB has had the authority to "appropriate" instream rights under
the same constitutional provision through which consumptive uses are
established. 7 6 That Colorado has specifically recognized ISF rights as
valid within its hallowed legal dominion of prior appropriation is
significant. Some might assume that Colorado's long association with
natural flow protection would equate to a more acquiescent
atmosphere. Why then has Colorado been so tentative in the face of
growing pressures to allow private actors into the ISF transfer game?
To begin with, CWCB came into being in 1937, lone before it
From its
received exclusive oversight of Colorado's ISF program.
inception, CWCB has had many mandates under Colorado law
More
unrelated to the preservation of natural stream flows.
specifically, CWCB "has been statutorily assigned a pro-development,
371.
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pro-water project mission.""" By charging the agency with WRDA
oversight, the 1973 legislation forced CWCB, at the onset, to balance
conflicting directives; leaving water instream is not the agency's central
concern under every circumstance.
For example, when a Colorado water court granted a use right to
the City of Golden to leave 1000 cfs instream for a kayak course,
CWCB opposed the grant of the right in subsequent litigation. T9 In an
official statement, CWCB noted that its opposition stemmed from the
fact that such a right would preclude all future development upstream
of the park.n ° In so noting, CWCB Director Rod Kuharich expressed
that the agency's duty is to "ensure the maximum utilization of water,"
not necessarily to rubberstamp any permit request that comes across
the desk.'
Under the letter of the law, "CWCB does not have much room to
negotiate an agreement that strikes a balance between the desire for
recreational instream flows and the needs for future water
A recent ballot proposal,
development in a given watershed."' '
submitted to the electorate in the November 2003 general election
On November 4, 2003,
would have compounded this problem.
Colorado voters considered Referendum A, which would have allowed
CWCB to borrow up to $2 billion through the issuance of revenue
bonds."3 The borrowed money would have been earmarked for the
Local
construction of new storage and water delivery projects.
environmental organizations took a strong stand against the
referendum, claiming it failed to protect communities, existing water
users, or the environment. At the time, the Sierra Club claimed,
"[t]he large dams and diversions that Referendum A is designed to
fund would likely harm the environment and cause great concern to
existing water users because there is [sic] no specific mitigation
strategies required for the projects it would finance." 84 The measure
would have further compromised CWCB's position as the state's lead
water resource conservation agency by entrusting it with the authority
to approve massive infrastructure-altering projects that would
conceivably conflict with CWCB's conservation mandates.
A second point to consider is the manner in which ISF leasing
statutes have found a place in states' existent water law structure. The
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380. News Release, Colorado Water Conservation Board, State Water Policy and
Planning Board Appeals Water Use Decision 1 (Aug. 1, 2001).
381. Id.
382. Memorandum from Dan McAuliffe et al., to Colorado Water Conservation
Board Members 3 (July 17, 2000) (on file with the University of Denver Water Law
Review).
383. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF THE 2003 BALLOT
PROPOSALS 11 (2003).
384. Steve Glazer, Referendum A Doesn't Solve Anything, PEAK & PRAIRIE (Rocky
Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club), Oct.-Dec. 2003, at 1.

WATER LA WIREVIEW

Volume 7

Montana and Oregon models detailed above developed in states
already receptive to instream flow protection initiatives occurring
outside the confines of prior appropriation. In Oregon, for example,
a citizens' ballot initiative created the 1970 Scenic Waterways
Program. 85 In Montana, the original "Murphy Rights" carried no real
appropriation date; under the 1969 statute, the previously
unappropriated waters left instream held "a priority over other uses
only until the district court ... determine[d] that such waters [were]
needed for a more beneficial use.""8 Ultimately, Oregon and Montana
repealed these and other conservation strategies or assimilated them
into their prior appropriation systems.
Notwithstanding the fact that free market transfers gained
acceptance free from the hindrances posed by prior appropriation, the
introduction of market mechanisms in each state was, and remains, a
laborious chore. In Colorado, lawmakers have been careful to draft
ISF protection laws so as not to offend the prior appropriation
doctrine. The enduring need to reconcile fully new ISF legislation
with the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado has hampered legal
receptiveness to concepts such as private ISF leasing.
Some have posited that prior appropriation and free-market
However, although the doctrine
policies naturally coalesce.
emphasizes "the allocation of water to and by individuals," most
western states treat the transfer of ISFs quite differently than they do
State government has
the transfer of more traditional rights.3
assumed much of the control over protection activities, and has
constrained individuals in their opportunities to protect ISFs. 3 9 "The
legal nonreceptivity to private instream acquisitions found in most
states is, more likely, a vestige of the historic prohibition of private
Prior
instream flow rights in the West, 3 8 which is misplaced.
appropriation has historically "sought to ensure that unutilized water is
available free of charge to anyone seeking to put it to a reasonable and
beneficial offstream use. ''-91 Now that Colorado has recognized
protection of the natural environment as a beneficial use, the State
should hold water transfers for instream use to the same standards as
those for offstream uses.
Putting aside the legal idiosyncrasies that separate Colorado from
other states, one sweeping question remains: is it legal for private
individuals to actively pursue existing offstream rights in order to
convert them back to natural flows? This question raises compelling
considerations regarding the proper steward of the public trust.
"[Legislatures may view instream flows as uniquely public in
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character, reflecting collective decisions about the commonweal.,
Should ISFs become freely tradable within a market system, some may
view the move as an intrusion on a domain legally reserved to the
state's regulatory bodies.
It would be presumptuous to assume that the existing structure of
ISF rules and regulations would systematically embrace the
introduction of a leasing program. In order for ISF leasing to work in
Colorado, program proponents would need to introduce legislation
respectful of the existing methods of ISF establishment. In balancing
this need against the necessity to institute a workable means of
transferring rights, the plan must work within some existing
parameters and require the modification of others. For instance, a
proposal might seek adjudicative bypass of lease agreements while
stopping short of an overhaul that would preclude CWCB approval of
all lease conveyances. Presently, no legal barriers exist to prevent
CWCB from entering lease agreements. In 1997, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service entered into a five-year lease agreement with CWCB
under which USFWS would release 2000 acre-feet of water from
Steamboat Lake in late summer at the rate of 25 cfs in order to protect
pikeminnow habitat.9 3 Again, the only major impediment to broader
leasing is the legal recognition of private funding mechanisms, which
could coexist within the exiting program given some fine-tuning of the
law.
B. POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE?

In 1989, Colorado's State Engineer noted that the 1973
amendment to the WRDA, which authorized CWCB limited instream
appropriations, grew at least in part out of a fear that "lunatics" would
appropriate all the state's water and wastefully leave it instream 94 By
leaving matters of ISF reservation in the hands of a gubernatoriallyappointed body, the Colorado Legislature could hold radical
environmentalists at bay. Thus, some saw the grant to CWCB of
exclusive authority over the establishment of new ISF rights as a
calculated move to deny private sector influence and funding in the
3 95
If true, from its inception CWCB has maintained an
ISF sphere.
institutional bias against the infiltration of private interests.
If CWCB indeed holds such a predisposition, this could be
problematic for those seeking to append a free market element to the
state's ISF protection program. The successes in Oregon and Montana
were attributable in no small part to the political support of existing
administrative entities. In Montana, for example, House Bill 472which allowed private sector involvement in ISF leasing-had the full
392. Thompson, supra note 11, at 288.
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support of MFWP. 396 MFWP believed a private market would serve as a
positive complement to the state program and would allow for more
involvement among agricultural users who were "reticent to deal with
the state." 9 7 Likewise, in the formative years of Oregon's ISF transfer
program, OWT staff members worked closely with OWRD and were
"key participants in a two year process of rule development for a
leasing program. '' "98
At present, CWCB support for leasing legislation would likely be
lesser than that offered by its counterparts in Oregon and Montana.
CWCB believes, perhaps rightly so, that its extensive experience,
uniformity of oversight and monitoring techniques, and ability to
identify and avoid potential harm to downstream water users justify its
position as the state's exclusive holder and steward of instream
rights. 9 With this in mind, the conservation sector should seek
passage of legislation providing more opportunities for public interest
groups to fund as well as target and solicit rights on endangered river
and stream reaches. Presently few codified means exist through which
such organizations may facilitate the leasing of ISF rights, even if only
to be held in trust by CWCB.
As a politically responsive executive body, 400 CWCB sentiment in
large part depends on the prevailing disposition of its "constituency"the state's (mostly agricultural and municipal) water users. Colorado's
competing water users still have a long way to go to achieve a complete
reconciliation of interests. Much can be learned from the experiences
of senior right holders in Oregon and Montana who-while similarly
situated in confrontational deadlock for a number of years 4-were
nevertheless able to fashion a leasing program suitable to all interests.
The principal variable in achieving this success was knowledge.
"Lack of information may be the single largest factor preventing the
further protection of instream flows. 4 02 Many fears could be allayed
and tempers quelled if stakeholders knew more about the benefits of
market transfers and the prevalence of harm-preventing safeguards in
To inform themselves, however, the
successful leasing systems.
concerned stakeholders must first create an environment wherein they
can exchange ideas and express perspectives.
A quest for a political resolution that satiates all concerns may
bring innate conflicts of interest to the surface of the debate.
However, this is not to say that a workable solution is entirely elusive.
From a practical standpoint, reconciliation will entail bringing a
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diverse array of interests to the bargaining table including senior
agricultural users, conservationists, agency officials, hydrologists, policy
makers, and others. Any working group so comprised, however, must
maintain a collective willingness to forgo traditional biases in favor of
universal betterment, and they must not only listen to each other's side
but also understand it. Professor Donald Snow of the University of
Montana has devised a "list of ingredients and attributes that seem to
be present in successful collaborative conservation efforts:"
(1) There has to be something significant to negotiate. And there
has to be the potential for net environmental gains or improvements
that could come about through negotiation.
(2) There is a perceived threat, major challenge, or new opportunity
[B]ut one does
for a power shift felt by all of the stakeholders ....
not need to place a negative spin on it. Sometimes, it is instead the
power of a perceived opportunity ....
(3) Creative, open-minded, courageous leaders have to be at the
table. They provide positive examples to each other and to their
constituents. They are capable of both learning and teaching, and
they are willing to engage in open conversation that may lead to
Collaborative conservation is
entirely unpredictable results.
fundamentally about flexibility, innovation, and cross-fertility. These
are all, ultimately, functions of mature leadership. Organizations
with names that include an exclamation point usually have the
hardest time with this form of leadership.
(4) Collaboration probably has to be viewed strategically, in large
measure as a means of overcoming political inertia. Another way of
saying this: The parties must realize that by working together, they
have real potential to create good outcomes that none of them could
create alone. As Matt McKinney of the Montana Consensus Council
puts it, "If you think you can get a better result another way, do it."
(5) There has to be a roughly equal power equation, not an equality
of magnitude among the parties at the table (a parity that almost
never exists), but rather within the context of the issue at hand.
There are many western resource issues in which environmentalists,
despite their scarce resources, hold very significant powers-instream
flow allocations, for example. As long as environmental organizations
can be granted water rights to protect rivers and streams, they are
powerful players under law. Perhaps it comes to this: the parties all
must have at least enough power to be able to block each4 °3others'
initiatives, but not enough power unilaterally to win the issue.
Professor Snow's observations are remarkably on-target in regard
to water market resistance in Colorado. That these elements are
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particular
to
successful conservation efforts
should
provide
encouragement to senior water users and private leasing proponents
alike. The first two criteria appear satisfied in Colorado, and the
development of a competent consensus group would go a long way
toward fulfilling the final three. Coalitions of water interests that
could serve as guiding models for working groups have already begun
to appear on the horizon. The Western Water Alliance ("WWA"), a
Seattle-based coalition of diverse interests has sought to bring
sustainable water management practices to the forefront of the policy
agenda across the West. In so doing, the organization promotes
building "the intellectual capital of the progressive western water
movement by collecting case studies, best practices and critical
information and commissioning studies that present West-wide
perspectives."0 4 Groups such as the WWA could thus prove a valuable
resource in the negotiation and policy formulation process, should
instream leasing receive a serious look in Colorado.
Looking back on successful negotiation efforts may be as valuable
as looking forward. For instance, the Policy Consensus Initiative issued
a case study regarding the Montana ISF leasing program.0 5 The study
addressed the tensions that arose during Montana's early attempts to
adopt legislation that would allow farmers and ranchers to sell
voluntarily their consumptive rights to interested parties. In the years
that followed, the study found, the working group of divergent
interests "spent several meetings learning about each other's needs
and interests," ultimately "refram[ing] the issue from one of winners
and losers to a perspective that the right solution would benefit
everyone."0 6 In so doing, the group settled upon proposed legislation
that would allow for the temporary leasing study. 0 Important to the
legislation's adoption, however, was the fact that during the drafting
process, the working group participants-namely agricultural users
and environmental interests-routinely "asked for advice from key
legislators and representatives from the office of the governor, the
[MFWP], and the DNRC." 0 8
In Colorado's political environment, advocates of broader free
marketing should be careful not to "put the cart before the horse."
The adoption of less invasive leasing legislation, however, would
"provide an opportunity for everyone to 'test the waters' at little
cost," 09 with CWCB maintaining its relative sovereignty and oversight
within a broadened ISF program. Implementing a temporary "leasing
study"-like that in Montana-might be appropriate. Legislation with
a sunset provision would take away any implications of finality while
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offering "a way for water right holders and organizations to become
comfortable with the idea of instream flow marketing." 0 If either
public interest groups or agricultural users were unhappy with the
result, they could either abandon the program or remedy its faults in a
subsequent incarnation of the statute.
C. PRACTICAL CONCERNS

1. Beneficial?
Under even the most collaborative environment, campaigns to
conserve natural resources oftentimes necessitate practical problemsolving at the implementation stage.- The protection of ISFs presents a
paradox in that it is often during times of water scarcity or low flow
Thus,
that competing stakeholders desire water the most.
"governmental agencies.., have found it politically difficult to seek
enforcement of instream flow rights during drought periods when the
instream flows are most needed, but when cities and farmers are also
frantic for water., 41 Even though Colorado legally recognizes ISFs as
valid appropriative uses, non-profits may struggle to find water users
willing to temporarily convert their rights when conditions are most
dire. If consumptive users are willing to transfer rights only during
times of high or normal flow, it is unclear whether a lease right would
in fact promote a beneficial use and thus satisfy the tenets of prior
appropriation.
Complicating the situation is the inherent interplay between
transferred rights and other decreed rights. When numerous users
with valid rights divert water on an overappropriated river, prior
appropriation permits those with the earliest appropriation dates to
remove their allotment to the detriment of junior users.412 If a junior
user in such a situation leases water under the condition that the lessee
leaves it instream, there are no guarantees the water will in fact be
available should flow rates become inordinately low. It may therefore
be difficult to determine before hand whether the leased right will
assuredly preserve the natural environment as a "beneficial use" under
all conditions.
The positive side is that many dry- and split-season lease
agreements result from the fact that during times of exceedingly low
flow-particularly late summer-the water remaining in a stream will
often not be nearly enough to satisfy the consumptive user's right.
Irrigators thus find themselves in possession of surplus water, as they
cannot effectively apply it to cropland or other consumptive uses.
Although flow rates may be insufficient to irrigate crops, they may
suffice to protect aquatic habitat or other beneficial instream needs.
Lease agreements under these circumstances present the right holder
410.
411.
412.
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with a tempting opportunity to benefit from the remainder of their
right without either abandoning it or wasting it.
Even though a water user is unable to achieve a beneficial use
through the traditional application of a right, that user may not
temporarily transfer the rights on a whim, In keeping with the
beneficial use requirement of the prior appropriation doctrine, ISF
leasing laws universally demand that the water leased in fact benefit a
recognized conservation value 4 3 In part for the reasons listed above,
this prerequisite-while steadfast-does not necessarily provide a
clear-cut resolution. MFWP has compiled a simplified checklist for
determining whether an instream lease would be appropriate-the
lease must "be Advantageous to the fishery, include Actual water
dedicated to instream flows, be Administrable by the Department or
other appropriate entity, and be Affordable." 4 Although the "four A's"
are meant to provide guidance for state acquisitions, they are
nonetheless applicable to potential private transactions. Following
MFWP's advice, targeted flows should meet the following criteria:
1. Advantageous to the fishery.

Attractive leasing opportunities are

those that address a stream flow problem that significantly limits
potential fishery values.
2. Actual water dedicated to instream flows. Leases must involve
valid water rights, and quantities leased should be large enough to
benefit the stream.
3. Administrable by the Department or other appropriate entity.
Leases should involve a reasonable combination of water right
seniority and advantageous location so that the instream flow
contribution can be ensured and defended through the lease
period....
4. Affordable. Do the benefits... justify the cost of the lease or the
project creating the leasing opportunity?
Concerning the first requirement, Colorado would afford water
marketers more leeway than Montana. As previously mentioned, the
Montana Legislature drafted leasing laws solely with the preservation
of fish stocks in mind. In Colorado, CWCB may acquire or establish
ISFs for the broader
purpose of preserving or improving the natural
416
environment.
What remains unclear is whether CWCB could temporarily convey
existing rights to or through private actors for the benefit of
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recreational activities. The answer is likely that it could not. Since the
Civil War Era, Colorado water law has refused to recognize recreation
as a valid purpose for seeking an instream flow water right.) Although
the Fort Collins"" decision tempered legal hostility toward ISF
reservations for recreational purposes, the Colorado Supreme Court's
holding nonetheless failed to officially condone recreation as a
legitimate beneficial use. 1 9 Recently, however, the legislature and the
courts substantially eased this restriction. A 2001 amendment to the
WRDA recognized a municipality's right to file for a "recreational inchannel diversion" ("RICD") and called on CWCB to promulgate rules
detailing theprocess through which cities and towns can request such
This statutory validation was upheld last year by
reservations.4
operation of law when the Colorado Supreme Court was equally
divided; the decision affirmed the Division 1 water court's approval of
These
an in-channel appropriation by the City of Golden.4 2
developments are certainly a boon for public interest proponents of
Nevertheless, those who advocate
enhanced recreational flows.
enhanced recreational opportunities through the establishment of
ISFs will likely need to work exclusively through civic channels as the
new laws confine the establishment
422 of RICDs to requests submitted by
enumerated government entities.
2. Enforceable?
Aside from advocating that ISF rights meet the statutorilymandated beneficial use requirement, MFWP guiding principles also
present issues in need of assessment at the operational level following
the establishment of a lease right. The two major components that
stand out are the acquisitions' enforceability and affordability. The
enforceability of a water right transferred under a lease depends
initially on whether the transfer would enlarge the existing right or
somehow inflict harm upon another non-involved water right. CWCB
has had over thirty years to hone its competence in evaluating the
propriety of converting consumptive rights to instream rights. The
agency has extensive experience in both ascertaining the extent of
decreed rights and in weighing the potential for material injury to
417. See Karen Abbott & Charley Able, Kayakers' Rights Stand: Split Supreme Court Gives
More Power to Recreational Users, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 19, 2003, at 5A.
418. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 929-30 (Colo. 1992).
419. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 119.
420. S. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-102(5), (6)).
421. State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003), affd by an equally
divided court In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Water
Division Ct. Div. No. 1,June 13, 2001).
422. See Christopher L. Thorne, Colorado Board Adopts Rules For "Recreational InChannel Diversion" Water Rights, WESTERN WATER LAw (Jan. 15, 2002), at
Authorized government entities
http://www.westernwaterlaw.com/ABAarticle.htm.
include "any county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation
district, water conservation district, or water conservancy district." COLO. REV. STAT.
37-92-102(5) (2003).
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water users within river basins of proposed ISFs.4 2 There is perhaps no
agency in the West better equipped to appraise the suitability of
potential ISF rights than CWCB.
CWCB has hesitated to permit ISF appropriations that might
enlarge a transferred right or cause harm to existing rights. If CWCB
were to permit ISF leasing in Colorado while maintaining a leadagency oversight position, those involved in the conveyance process
would have to meet stringent standards of beneficial use and nonharm. CWCB's record on enforcing ISF rights after they have received
approval, however, is not nearly as unblemished. In 1995, the supreme
court compelled CWCB to enforce an instream right it held-even
though CWCB sought allowance of a diminution in flow. 4 4 The case
pitted conservationists against the state agency and raised important
questions regarding CWCB's fiduciary duty to the people of the state.42'
Ultimately, the court held that CWCB must refrain from
administratively relinquishing ISF rights while circumventing the
adjudicative process.426 This decision implies private interests would
have a receptive forum in the state's water courts in which to air
potential grievances and would have strong legal standing to enforce
lease rights in the appropriate court should the terms of such
agreements be contravened. 27 However, any legislation would also
need to spell out mechanisms through which funding would be
generated in order to cover enforcement costs. "[T]he [CWCB] has
equipment to monitor its rights;
no field personnel and quite limited
'
thus, enforcement rarely occurs. 11
Although competent enforcement of privately leased ISF rights
would benefit the public at large, water trusts and other public interest
groups should be careful in requesting a provision in the law that
would require the State to bear the financial burden of monitoring
expenses. The introduction of an ISF leasing allowance within the
WRDA would stimulate an influx of decreed temporary rights
throughout numerous river basins. Rather than asking the State to
pick up the tab on these monitoring costs, private facilitators could
help defray the expenses.

423. CWCB agency rules require that even before it initiates a water right filing, the
Board find that any proposed ISF appropriation: (1) will benefit the natural
environment; (2) entails the appropriation of available water; and (3) can exist
without causing injury to other decreed water rights. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-2(5i)

(2003).
424. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1261 (Colo. 1995).
425. See Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and Environmental Protection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 70, 75-76 (1999).
426. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1261.
427. In fact, current CWCB rules permit any person that provides the Board water
for instream use to enforce the transfer arrangement "in the water court having
jurisdiction over the water right according to the terms of the contract or agreement."
2 COLO. CODE.REGS. § 408-2(6d) (2003).
428. Melinda Kassen, A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 58, 65 n.47 (1999).
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Under the first option, organizations active in privately funding
transfers could audit temporary rights directly-under CWCB
authorization and in accordance with agency guidelines. Under the
second option, these organizations could compensate the State
appropriately through use of a fee schedule. CWCB, in turn, would be
responsible for monitoring privately facilitated rights in the same
manner as it monitors rights in its current portfolio. Other states have
tackled the enforcement cost issue and have come up with workable
solutions. For example, in 1991, the Nature Conservancy of Montana
committed funding to help establish the Montana Water Leasing Trust
Fund, which "served as a repository for contributions from private
individuals, foundations, and corporations who wanted to help
implement the [state] leasing program. 429
The Nature Conservancy approach represents just one potential
way to generate revenue to cover enforcement costs, and there is
certainly room for creativity in devising new approaches. Regardless of
how such revenue is raised, it is important that ISF leasing laws clearly
define who pays monitoring costs and how the costs will be divided.
3. Affordable?
The final factor MFWP addresses is cost effectiveness. While issues
of enforcement and beneficial use often involve legal determinations
and agency collaboration, the true test of a water right's value in a free
market is largely determined by the market itself:
The motivating force behind water markets is mutual perception by
potential buyers and sellers that economic gains may be captured by
transferring water to a place or purpose of use in which it generates
higher net returns than under the existing use patterns. Economic
returns to buyers must be large enough (or be perceived as large
enough)430to outweigh the costs of obtaining water through the market
process.
Water marketing-particularly the buying and selling of
consumptive use rights-tends to obey general laws of economics;
parties enter contracts to acquire goods when doing so will maximize
their interests.
41
Although water is essentially a public resource across the West, "
water rights applied to traditional consumptive purposes have long
been freely transferable subject to certain criteria, including the no
harm rule.432 Over the years, water brokers have contrived elaborate
methods for determining the value of water as applied to particular
out-of-channel uses. Those involved in off-stream water marketing

429.
430.
431.

Landry, supra note 45, at 8.
Colby, supra note 283, at 6-15.
GETCHES, supra note 301, at 82-83.

432. See generally id. at 156, 161-62 (describing the no harm rule's role in changes of
use of a water right, and transfers generally).
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have developed valuation methods for the many means of transferring
water, which include sales, exchanges, and leases. In fact, proponents
of consumptive-use leasing have looked no further than Colorado for a
blueprint for expanding market approaches to water management.
One of the best-established markets for water operates in the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District. "About 30 percent of ' the
4
district's 310,000 shares move through its rental market each year. '
Although cost determination methods are established in markets
for diverted water, approaches to appraising instream rights are still in
their relative infancy. Valuation methods for instream rights are both
less common and more difficult to develop than those for consumptive
rights. As discussed earlier, several reasons exist for this. First, and
most notably, most state laws prohibit the existence of an open ISF
market.4 34 The absence of legal mechanisms for converting water to
instream use has offered little incentive to develop techniques for
determining the value of instream flows.4n
Second, the
aforementioned administrative process associated with ISF transfers
assigns external costs to the transactions. Because ISF leasing is
relatively untested even where allowed, it may be difficult to quantify
these external costs ahead of time in order to factor them into a final
appraisal. 3 Finally, "instream flows have 'public good' characteristics
which make it difficult to translate the economic benefits provided by
streamflows
into money" to be used to compete for rights in a free
43 7
market.

Despite the factors working against free ISF leasing, a rapidly
emerging market has driven the need to devise means of assigning
dollar values to ISF lease rights. Clay Landry, founder of WestWater
Research, a firm specializing in water rights valuations, offers four
methods.4"3 The first, the "sales comparison approach," assigns a dollar
value to a right based on a comparison of the subject water right with
similarly situated water rights.3'
The second, the "income
capitalization," or "farm-crop budget analysis," approach was that
which OWT first employed, and is the most popular method of
valuation for lease transactions. This method involves estimating the
revenues an agricultural user would forego because of production
decreases resulting from a water lease."' The third, the "land value
differential approach," calculates the value differential between the
worth of agricultural land with and without appurtenant water rights.44'
The final method, "the development-cost approach," assigns an ISF
433. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER: WATER
PUMP 103 (1997).
434. SeeColby, supranote 283, at 6-21.
435. Id. at 6-21.
436. See id.
437. Id. at 6-22.
438. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 154.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 154-55, n.58.
441. Id. at 155.
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value based on the price consumptive users would be willing to pay to
develop
new water supplies in lieu of continued use of the exiting
44
right.
Each method has its own benefits and shortcomings. Use of the
sales comparison method is appealing because of its "straightforward
443
However, a lack of comparable water rights in the area
approach."
The income
of the targeted right may preclude this method.
capitalization approach allows lessees and lessors to arrive at a figure
that reflects the lessor's true economic loss from the agreement. This
method has received criticism for simplifying the relationship between
water and the rest of the agricultural production process. 4" The land
differential value has received praise for being "easy to observe and
calculate." 45 Nonetheless, it offers only a rough estimate of a right's
value, which it tends to overestimate.146 Finally, the development-cost
approach works well when alternative sources-particularly
groundwater-are available for the lessor to develop in lieu of
continued use of the existing right. 44
This approach has two
limitations: OWT has yet to test its effectiveness, and it may be used
only when alternative sources are available.4 s
The above methods offer a useful toolkit for upstart water trusts
and conservation groups. Nevertheless, their use must include due
regard for the broader picture and the numerous external
circumstances that inevitably influence the market worth of surface
water rights. For instance, in areas where little urban demand exists,
such as Montana, "valuation is based largely on value of crop
production foregone in converting an irrigation right to an instream
right., 449 While this income capitalization approach may be applicable
in some areas of Colorado, in other areas it may not be feasible. On
the Front Range, where agriculture and municipalities compete
fiercely for water, ISF water brokers could expect to pay inordinate
lease rates. Landry's 1998 study found that in regions that anticipate
growth and corresponding municipal water needs, private institutions
4510
In areas
could expect to pay up to $200 per acre-foot to lease water.
lessors acquired ISF rights for
not susceptible to such encroachment,
41
as little as $0.08 per acre-foot. 5
Even within a specific geographical region or river basin, each
transaction deserves consideration "on a case-by-case basis, and the
dollar value of each deal [must reflect] the unique characteristics of

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 155.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Letter from David Collinge, supra note 239, at 2.
See Landry, supra note 146, at 12-14.
Id.
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that particular transaction."452 The seniority of a right is certainly an
important determining factor, thus "a senior water right that
historically receives its full rate and duty is normally more valuable
than a junior right.' 3 Another important factor to consider is the
extent to which a given right will benefit a coveted conservation value.
A public interest organization may be willing to pay much more for a
late-season lease involving 15 cfs that would restore historical habitat to
a threatened species than it would be willing to pay for a 50 cfs lease
that would not.
Colorado's sparse history of ISF leasing gives organizations such as
the CWT little to go on for comparative purposes. CWCB has entered
a limited number of leases, such as the Yampa River lease, through
which it obtained 2000 acre-feet of water at a rate of $16.00 per acrefoot.454 Ultimately, however, rights simply carry a value equal to that
which a potential lessee is willing to pay to see the water left instream.
The crux of the argument for instream right leasing, after all, rests on
the premise that water users should be able to deal with more than just
other consumptive users. If public sentiment believes ecological
restoration and protection are as important a value as consumption, a
market will develop, and with it, competitive bidding on available
rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the continuing dialogue regarding Colorado's water
management policy, water users, environmentalists, politicians, and
others have presented arguments as diverse as the stakeholders
themselves. At the center of debate, however, is one fundamental
truism-the state's water resources remain finite while contending
needs demand increasing amounts of water. The solution to this
conundrum lies in alternative methods of apportionment among
historically adverse parties. Although budding alliances among various
water users have been encouraging, mere amiable conditions alone are
far from enough to solve the problem. Regardless of the successful
cohesion of the state's water interests, they will still need to overcome
numerous legal, logistical, and political barriers.
Financial support will continue to fund an ever-solidifying
conservationist agenda. The only question that remains is how that
money will affect the management of water in Colorado. To date,
public interest groups' primary recourse has been to invest vast
percentages of their resources in attempts to litigate and regulate river
basins back to health. At times, the end result is the non-consensual
imposition of regulatory or judicial constraints on property owners,
which only fuels resentment toward the environmental cause. In other
cases, restoration and preservation initiatives are either defeated or

452.
453.
454.

Neuman & Chapman, supranote 149, at 156.
Id.
COLORADO RIVER REcOVERY PROGRAM, supra note 393.
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compromised. Regardless of the outcome, reformists and proponents
of the status quo continue to waste significant amounts of energy and
money in legal entanglements with each other. Current trends in the
law have cultivated this adversarial atmosphere.
However, the
implementation of a free market leasing allowance presents a way not
only to quell historical hostilities but also to forge solutions to
impending water crises.
This proposition is not merely speculative. States such as Oregon
and Montana have proved that the introduction of free market
principles to ISF preservation schemes does not ineluctably contravene
the tenets of prior appropriation. On the contrary, these states have
managed to reconcile ISF preservation and prior appropriation, and in
so doing have spawned numerous success stories. The influx of private
funding into restoration and conservation efforts has enabled the
protection of hundreds of miles of previously depleted rivers and
streams. As demonstrated by the discrete approaches detailed above,
states are free to develop leasing strategies uniquely tailored to the
states' political nature and existing water management structure. For
example, organizations that obtain privately facilitated and funded
leases may hold them directly, or the state may hold them in trust for
the people. Although administrative barriers at times hinder active
trading, recent years have nevertheless witnessed substantial overall
growth in private ISF marketing throughout the West.
Lease rights by their very definition offer only temporary fixes, and
alone they cannot offer universal redress to water shortage issues.
However, given stringent pre-conversion review, and mechanisms to
fund sound monitoring and administrative oversight, temporary free
market transfers can be an extremely effective tool for leaving water
instream. Public interest organizations are able to broker deals with
existing water users without acquiring permanent interests, thus
maintaining their spending flexibility.
Agricultural and other
consumptive water users, meanwhile, can exercise free will in terms of
how to best utilize their rights. Moreover, market incentives, when
properly administered, do not create the same negative connotations
as command and control methods for environmental stewardship, and
thus foster cooperation instead of conflict.
Colorado was the first state to formally adopt the laws of prior
appropriation, which it did in its original constitution in 1876. 455 The
principles embodied in that doctrine have held strong through many
years and in the face of mounting pressure for change. Nevertheless,
as in any legal domain, the state's water laws have shown a degree of
adaptability. Indeed, state lawmakers have demonstrated a willingness
to institute change to many aspects of the ISF protection program. In
what may possibly be measured advances toward private involvement
in preserving instream flows, the State may now appropriate flows to
improve rather than to merely maintain the environment. Although it

455. See IRRIGATION

WATER, supra note

22, at 7.
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fails to introduce market incentives to ISF conversions, the new
legislation permitting water users to loan rights to the State during
drought conditions nonetheless took an important step in recognizing
the legal validity of temporary water right transfers.
In addition to expanding the reach of the existing ISF program,
CWCB has shown more activity in establishing new appropriations of
late. Although it filed for just one ISF right in 2001, "in 2002, the
CWCB filed for instream flow rights on 21 river segments across the
state.,,45 , In one case, CWCB partially relied upon citizen-submitted
data in its decision to establish a new ISF appropriation. Colorado
Trout Unlimited touted this move as "an important demonstration
457
that the public can be a partner" in the ISF protection program.
Nonetheless, for every principle in Colorado water law that has yielded
to the outcry for expanded instream enhancement opportunities,
many more have steadfastly resisted change. The state has stopped far
short of allowing private actors to exercise fully their purchasing power
through the direct funding of ISF transfers. Permitting non-profits
such as CWT to engage in such participation, even if merely on a trial
basis, would seem to be the next logical step in the continuing
evolution of sensible water management policy.

456.
457.

DRY LEGACY 2, supra note 20, at 2.
Id.

